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Abstract 
This study evaluates the revenue productivity of Ghana's overall tax system and of 
individual taxes on the basis of estimates of tax buoyancies and elasticities. It also looks 
at the links between the tax reform of 1983-1993 and revenue performance, as well as at 
ways of mobilizing additional revenue. The analysis shows that the tax reform has had 
significant impact on the productivity of both the individual taxes and the overall tax 
system. All the individual taxes, except for cocoa export tax and excise duties, showed 
buoyancies and elasticities of more than unity during the reform period, thereby causing 
the overall tax system to have a buoyancy and elasticity of more than unity each. The 
sharp improvement in the revenue productivity during the reform period was due 
principally to the successive devaluations of the exchange rate. It was also supported by 
the large inflow of foreign loans, the abolition of the price control and import licensing 
system, the simplification of the import tariff rates, and the complete overhaul of the tax 
administration. The tax reform succeeded in improving revenue generation, enhancing 
the efficiency of the tax administration and improving equity in the tax system. It also 
removed market distortions and strengthened economic incentives. Despite this, the share 
of government revenue in GDP remains low compared with the average obtained in 
developing countries, which calls for ways to mobilize additional revenue. Various revenue 
enhancement options were found to be available for use by the tax authorities. These 
options include the introduction of VAT to replace the existing sales tax, revaluation of 
properties to broaden the base of property tax, a review of the definition of income for 
the purposes of income tax, and further improvement in the tax administration to increase 
tax collection and to combat evasion and fraud. 
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I. Introduction 
Economic growth increases the taxable capacity of a country and enables a larger share 
of the private sector's resources to be ceded to the government as taxes to provide public 
goods and services. Many countries, therefore, depend mainly on taxation as a means of 
generating the required resources to meet their expenditure requirements. These countries 
will likely find themselves in growing fiscal imbalance when their revenue productivity 
falls below their expenditures. The need for fiscal adjustment then becomes particularly 
necessary to restore balance in the government budget. 
The efficacy of fiscal adjustment to accomplish fiscal obligations depends on the tax 
base or capacity relative to the expenditure requirements of the public sector. This fiscal 
position defining the ratio of capacity to requirements approximates the marginal benefits 
of public expenditures vis-a-vis marginal sacrifice of the citizenry. The higher the fiscal 
performance, with tax efforts yielding high service returns, the nearer the budget moves 
towards a balance. To achieve high fiscal performance, however, the various facets of 
revenue and expenditure estimates must be meticulously systematized and minutely 
analysed within the general macroeconomic framework. Hence budgets that produce 
good results tend to analyse prevailing economic circumstances, both internally and 
externally, and take into account the macroeconomic projections of economic growth 
rate, money supply behaviour, inflationary pressures, employment levels and balance of 
payments positions. Without proper analysis and adequate harmony, the formulation of 
revenue and expenditure policies that would produce high fiscal performance will not be 
achieved. 
The Ghanaian experience with fiscal performance in the 1970-1982 period was very 
disappointing. During this period, macroeconomic analyses and projections were not 
exhaustively undertaken to provide a base for effective and consistent fiscal policy 
formulation. Instead, fiscal policy measures were taken on an ad hoc basis, uncoordinated, 
and haphazardly implemented, leading to a severe deterioration in the country's public 
finances. A rapid growth in government expenditure accompanied by a relatively low 
growth in revenue resulted in persistent budgetary deficits financed mainly by the banking 
system. Consequently, the money supply rose sharply, causing rapid growth in the inflation 
rate and an increasingly over-valued exchange rate. Attempts to suppress the inflationary 
spiral through official control of domestic prices added a further setback to the 
government's economic policy. The price control system, together with the over-valued 
exchange rate, created severe distortions in the economy (World Bank, 1984). These in 
turn destroyed incentives for production and exports and encouraged speculation and 
2 RESEARCH PAPER 7 4 
smuggling. They also expanded the parallel market activities where large private "rents" 
were reaped at the expense of social benefits to the national economy. 
The World Bank (1984) also found that economic activity shifted from the monetary 
to the subsistence sector, indicating a withdrawal from the monetized economy by some 
people and a collapse of the organized markets. These developments led to a sharp 
contraction in the tax base and consequently in the ability of the government to mobilize 
enough revenue to meet its expenditure requirements. Attempts to increase the tax revenue 
without rationalizing the structure of the tax system led to high marginal rates on a 
shrinking base. The result was a further deterioration in economic incentives and a massive 
shift of economic activities to the parallel markets and expansion of unrecorded cross-
border trade. 
In response to the decline of the economy, the Government of Ghana (GOG) initiated 
a comprehensive programme of stabilization and structural adjustment in 1983, aimed at 
laying the foundations for sustained economic growth and the achievement of external 
payments viability. A key element of the programme was the restoration of fiscal discipline 
and pursuit of a growth-oriented fiscal strategy. The fiscal adjustment involved not only 
a determined effort at expenditure control to reduce budget deficits but also an increase 
in domestic resource mobilization through a comprehensive reform in the system of 
taxation. 
In reducing the fiscal deficit as part of a structural adjustment programme, it is 
important to be able to project what additional revenue can be mobilized within the 
existing tax system as the economy grows. This requires an analysis of the revenue sources 
and their responsiveness to GDP growth. Such an analysis will permit the identification 
of the sources of fast revenue growth or, conversely, the causes of lagging revenue growth, 
thereby suggesting measures to adopt to maximize revenue within the existing tax system 
and/or the need to activate additional means of revenue generation. Knowledge of the 
responsiveness of tax revenue to economic growth is thus of crucial importance for 
economic planning purposes since budgetary deficits financed through monetary 
expansion generally create inflationary problems. 
This study focuses on the revenue-generating implications of the tax reform initiated 
in Ghana in 1983. The specific objectives are twofold. First, the study seeks to evaluate 
the revenue productivity of the overall tax system and of individual taxes on the basis of 
estimates of tax elasticities and buoyancies. Second, the study attempts to explain the 
links of the tax reform measures to revenue performance and assesses ways of mobilizing 
additional revenue. 
II.Tax reform: Some theoretical issues, 
experience and lessons 
Optimal taxation and reform 
The theories of optimal taxation are analogous to the examination of the principles of 
taxation, where lump-sum taxes are impossible. The analysis of optimal commodity 
taxation began with Ramsey (1927), but the subject expanded in the 1970s, following the 
Diamond-Mirrlees papers of 1971. The subject of optimal income taxation was created 
by Mirrlees (1971). 
The general principles of optimal taxation can be summarized as follows: (1 ) tax 
revenue is raised most efficiently by taxing goods or factors with inelastic demand or 
supply (this abstracts from distributional questions where inelasticity refers to 
compensated demands and supplies); and (2) taxation concerned with distribution and 
with externalities or market failures should as much as possible go to the root of the 
problem. Thus for distribution, one should look for the sources of inequality (for example, 
land endowments or earned incomes) and should concentrate taxation there. In the case 
of externalities, one should attempt to tax or to subsidize directly the good or activity that 
produces the externality (Stern , 1988a). 
As can be seen, the optimal tax theory draws a sharp distinction between cases in 
which it is desirable to promote efficiency (because to do so does not compromise the 
prospect of equity) and cases in which efficiency must be sacrificed in the pursuit of 
equity. Trade taxes and taxes on intermediate goods that introduce inefficiencies into 
production, for example, will be undesirable unless they provide additional leverage 
over the distribution of welfare, which they will not, provided that production is 
competitive and consumers can be taxed on their consumption. These efficiency results 
only require social welfare to be an increasing function of the individual welfare. In 
cases where equity and efficiency must be balanced, as in the design of direct and indirect 
taxes on consumers, the tax rates will depend on the exact form of the social welfare 
function (Newbery, 1988). 
The optimal model developed for modern tax analysis appears to be quite inappropriate 
lor most developing countries. First, the model is perfectly competitive and, in the absence 
of distortionary taxes, would yield an efficient equilibrium. The problem here is that 
governments are concerned with the issue of raising revenue and improving the distribution 
ot income but do not have enough information about the preferences and endowments of 
their citizens to do so by means of lump-sum taxes. Even if governments are successful 
in eliminating market failures in production and in ensuring competitive behaviour and 
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hence production efficiency, they would be faced with an inevitable conflict between 
equity and efficiency in allocating output among consumers. Governments can, therefore, 
make redistributive taxes depend only on information revealed by consumers in the course 
of choosing their hours of work, their occupation, and their income and consumption 
pattern. When taxes paid are made to depend on these behavioural responses, they 
influence and distort the responses with some loss in efficiency. Taxes may also depend 
on family size, age and possibly disabilities, which may in large part be unalterable 
characteristics. In effect, governments can achieve their aim by using taxes that give rise 
to distortions (Newbery, 1988). Second, in the optimal model, the only constraint limiting 
the choice of the tax system is information about preferences and endowments, whereas 
in developing countries institutional, political, administrative, structural and cultural 
constraints may drastically limit the range of tax instruments that are effectively available. 
By "tax reform" we mean a movement away from some given status quo. According 
to the general theory of tax reform, it will be beneficial to switch taxation at the margin 
from i to j, if the marginal cost of tax i exceeds that of tax j. More generally, a tax reform 
is beneficial if it increases both revenue and social welfare. In relation to shadow prices, 
a tax should be increased if the direct impact on households of making the change exceeds 
the cost at shadow prices of the extra demand generated. The shadow price of a good 
embodies the welfare consequences of the general equilibrium adjustments that flow 
from an extra demand for that good. Thus the shadow price depends on the way in which 
the economy adjusts (Stein, 1988b). 
Newbery and Stein (1988) have analysed tax reform in a normative framework 
provided by the theory of optimal taxation. The analysis attempts to account for the 
impact of tax reform on tax-induced losses in the efficiency of resource allocation and 
on vertical equity norms. The former dimension of the reform is captured by the 
responsiveness of taxpayers to tax-induced relative price changes, and the latter on the 
particular specifications of a social welfare function. Optimal tax reforms in this context 
tend to be those that minimize efficiency costs (excess burden) of taxation and pay attention 
to income inequality. An interesting feature of these reforms is that they seldom endorse 
a uniform pattern of tax rates. The Ramsey rule, for example, calls for a highly 
differentiated structure of taxation by varying the tax rate inversely with the elasticity of 
demand and supply. 
Although the reforms suggested by optimal taxation are based upon rigorous economic 
theory, as Thirsk (1995), Deaton (1988) and McLure (1989) have emphasized, putting 
them into operation leads to an intractably large number of rates, which would be difficult 
to calculate and infeasible to administer effectively. Slemrod (1990) has argued that the 
optimal tax theory can serve as a guide to designing "optimal tax systems", only if one 
considers the technology of tax collection, i.e., the feasibility of tax instruments, the cost 
of administration and compliance. 
Despite the flirtation with the undeniable logic of optimal tax theory, many recent tax 
reforms have focused on achieving broader based taxation at more uniform rates. Unlike 
the earlier pleas for broader based taxation, which called for greater progressivity, the 
current appeals are for lower marginal tax rates and reductions in the level of tax-induced 
distortions that are prompted by high rates (Thirsk, 1995). In this manner, the lessons of 
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optimal tax theory have infused recent tax reform efforts with a new respect for economic 
efficiency. 
Experience with tax reform 
Recent experience with growth-oriented adjustment programmes in developing countries 
indicates that tax reform is an essential component of any comprehensive strategy for 
structural adjustment and resumption of growth (see Chhibber and Khalilzadeh-Shirazi, 
1988). As Musgrave (1988) has pointed out, however, tax reform in developing countries 
involves broad issues of economic policy as well as specific problems of tax structure 
design and administration. First, there are the central problems of revenue requirements 
and how to fit the revenue structure into development policy. This area of concern includes 
the impact of alternative taxes on saving and investment and their implications for the 
macro balance (domestic and foreign) of the economy. Second, there is the important 
goal of securing a fair distribution of the tax burden. Among the more specific tax issues, 
attention needs to be given to the composition of the tax structure as well as to the design 
of its major components. The problem throughout is not simply to determine what would 
be desirable but also to assess what is administratively practicable and within the ballpark 
of political feasibility. 
A common feature of the tax structures in most developing countries is that they are 
complex (difficult to administer and comply with), inelastic (nonresponsive to growth 
and discretionary policy measures), inefficient (raise little revenue but introduce serious 
economic distortions), inequitable (treat individuals and businesses in similar 
circumstances differently), and unfair (tax administration and enforcement are selective 
and skewed in favour of those with the resources to defeat the system). There is a heavy 
reliance on taxes on international trade, which undermines long-term international 
competitiveness. User charges and taxes on income and property contribute only a small 
proportion of total revenues. Agricultural income, fringe benefits and, in some countries, 
public sector wages are not taxed. Taxes on wealth, bequests, land and property exist in 
theory but have been rendered ineffective by design problems or the lack of interest in 
administration, or both, while personal and corporate income taxes are levied on narrow 
bases at high rates. Sales taxes are levied in a cascading manner, thereby imposing tax 
pyramiding and, in some cases, more than 100% full forward shifting (Khalilzadeh-
Shirazi and Shah, 1995; Bird, 1995; Shalizi and Squire, 1988). 
Faced with mounting budget deficits and having to cut expenditures as far as is 
prudently possible, particularly on public investment and social spending, a number of 
developing countries have undertaken to restructure their system of taxation to seek higher 
revenue or improve the revenue elasticity and buoyancy of the tax system. Other goals of 
these reform processes have been to eliminate the disincentive effects of the levels of 
taxation; to reduce the economic inefficiencies induced by the distortionary taxation of 
assets and sectors; to protect the poorest of the poor from the tax net; and to provide 
partial relief from the unwelcome effects of inflation (Khalilzadeh-Shirazi and Shah, 
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1995). Thus revenue enhancement, economic efficiency, horizontal equity and simplicity 
issues have dominated the world agenda on tax reform. 
In pursuit of revenue enhancement, many countries are relying less on narrowly based 
trade taxes and are emphasizing consumption taxes. To reduce the disincentive effects of 
taxation, some countries have brought down the average and marginal effective tax rates 
by eliminating ineffective tax preferences and thereby broadening the bases, while 
levelling the rates. These measures, however, compromise vertical equity. As Musgrave 
(1995) points out, broadening the bases may raise the threshold of taxation and have 
fewer and lower tax rates, but it does not pay adequate attention to the distribution of 
relative tax burdens across income groups. Some countries have attempted to protect the 
poor by exempting or zero rating foods under a value added tax (VAT) and by raising the 
threshold of taxes on personal income, urban property and agricultural land. 
Despite the wave of tax reforms over the globe, and the remarkable similarity in the 
broad directions of the reforms, a number of unresolved and controversial issues remain. 
For example, vertical equity and international income taxation have received only scanty 
attention in many tax reforms. Emphasis on redistributive role of the tax system is gradually 
waning - a direct consequence of the fact that tax evasion is so pervasive. The proper role 
of progressive income taxation is an extensively debated issue, as is the question of 
whether personal income tax should have fewer brackets and rates on account of simplicity. 
Although progressivity remains high on the political agenda in theory, often the political 
will to enforce income tax compliance is lacking. And on the question of replacing income 
taxes by broadly based consumption (expenditure) or cash-flow taxes, perplexing 
philosophical and transitional issues continue to dominate current discussions. Vertical 
equity is increasingly being perceived as an elusive goal and therefore is being assigned 
a lower order of priority in tax reform. All recent attempts at tax reform have curtailed 
tax preferences, especially for investment, but some economists argue that certain tax 
incentives, such as investment tax credit, are desirable because they lower the user cost 
of (new) capital, thereby encouraging greater capital formation. 
Lessons for tax reform 
Tax reform experiences to date offer some important insights into useful tax policy design 
and institutional development. A detailed discussion of this issue is provided in 
Khalilzadeh-Shirazi and Shah, (1995). A brief summary is presented below: 
1. The value added tax should be an instrument of choice for developing countries 
contemplating reform of their sales tax. According to Harberger (1990), there was no 
such thing as value added tax (VAT) some fifty years ago. Since its introduction in 
the early 1950s, however, VAT has become a fiscal innovation that has swept half of 
the world, including many developing countries. The VAT has thus become an 
instrument of choice for most developing countries contemplating reform of their 
sales tax. A VAT can provide greater revenue, tax neutrality (economic efficiency) 
and, under certain circumstances and to a limited extent, vertical equity. 
2. The base of existing taxes should be broadened at the same time that tax administration 
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reform is carried out. Base broadening is compatible with a number of economic 
objectives. It can increase revenues and improve the simplicity, neutrality and equity 
of the tax system. 
3. The use of the tax system for special tax preferences should be carefully evaluated. 
Using the system to provide tax incentives (tax expenditures) usually causes a serious 
drain on the national treasury by conferring windfall gains on existing activities or 
by shifting resources to tax-preferred activities. 
4. Tax reform must take into account the initial conditions at home and abroad. In 
reforming their tax systems, developing countries are severally constrained not only 
by their own institutional settings but also by the tax structure in capital-importing 
countries. Moreover, the circumstances in many developing countries are usually 
such that they would experience serious transitional difficulties if the tax system 
were to be redesigned from scratch. Developing countries must therefore take into 
account initial conditions at home and abroad. 
5. The credibility of the tax regime is the key to the success of any tax reform. A stable 
tax policy environment encourages businesses to take a longer-term perspective in 
their finance and investment decisions. Making tax changes without giving adequate 
consideration to transitional arrangements can undermine the credibility of the tax 
regime. Therefore, transitional arrangements require much more careful analysis than 
they have hitherto been given in developing countries. In addition, tax changes must 
be presented as part of longer term strategy to improve the public sector environment 
for the private sector. The tax regime will gain the confidence of business if more 
attention is paid to the preparation and analysis of reforms, advance consultation, 
providing a reasonable period of adjustment prior to implementation and ensuring 
consistency of the reform measures. 
6. The tax reform process must be well coordinated. Coordinated tax reform offers 
significant advantage over isolated piecemeal tinkering with the tax system. A 
coordinated reform ensures that individual tax changes will be consistent with the 
central objective. For example, a reduction in tariffs without a corresponding increase 
in other taxes, generally of a value added type, can increase the fiscal deficit and 
exacerbate macroeconomic difficulties. Furthermore, to improve economic 
performance in general, tax reform should be closely integrated with structural 
adjustment measures. 
III. Fiscal performance prior to 1983 
The fiscal budget 
A detailed assessment of the Ghanaian fiscal performance will not be complete without 
first examining the structure and coverage of the fiscal budget and its respective 
constituents. Ghana's fiscal budget covers all governmental functions and activities at 
national, regional and local levels. All government monies belong to the Consolidated 
Fund from which all disbursements are made. On the revenue side are three broad 
categories: tax revenue, non-tax revenue and grants. The expenditure side comprises 
current and capital (development) expenditure. 
Concerning the revenue side, taxes are further divided into indirect taxes and direct 
taxes. The indirect taxes category comprises taxes on domestic goods and services and 
taxes on foreign trade and transactions, while the direct taxes side comprises taxes on 
income and property. Indirect tax estimates are arrived at by adjusting the current figures 
for the expected rate of growth in domestic demand as well as changes in the volume and 
composition of this domestic demand. Similarly, direct taxes on income and property are 
adjusted in accordance with the expected growth of incomes, profits and employment. 
Here, it is important to single out the role of the cocoa sector both as a foreign exchange 
earner and vital revenue source of the government. 
Non-tax revenues consist of fees, interests, profits and dividends, fines, penalties and 
forfeitures, and rent from government property. Grants, which are essentially capital 
receipts, include (largely) borrowing from abroad and local sources. 
On the expenditure side are the recurrent and development budget. The recurrent 
expenditure comprises expenditures on all governmental activities: general administration, 
law and order, defence, community and social services, and direct government economic-
activities. This category of expenditure also includes interest payments on public debt as 
well as transfers or subventions to parastatal organizations. The development expenditure, 
on the other hand, consists of outlays for acquisition of new capital assets, purchase of 
existing capital goods and transfers to state-owned enterprises. 
The Ghanaian fiscal system, up to 1985, was characterized by a persistent gap between 
expenditures and revenues, with the gap widening during the fiscal expansion in the 
mid1970s and narrowing in the more stable period of the second half of the 1960s. Tabic 
1 shows the central government finances in levels and as percentages of GDP. Figure 1 
displays the central government finances as percentage of GDP. Table 1 shows that the 
budget in each year of 1960-1967 was in surplus, with the surplus reaching 4.1% oi 
GDP. 
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Table 1: Central government finances (1960-1993) 
9 
Year Current Total Fiscal balance Current Total Fiscal 
revenue expenditure revenue expenditure balance 
(In million cedis) (as % of GDP) 
1960 147 130 16 15.3 13.6 1.1 
1961 161 156 5 15.2 15.2 0.5 
1962 163 162 1 14.9 14.8 0.1 
1963 184 176 8 15.3 14.6 0.6 
1964 226 217 9 16.6 16.0 0.7 
1965 295 235 60 20.1 16.0 4.1 
1966 257 219 38 16.9 14.4 2.5 
1967 263 261 3 17.5 17.3 0.2 
196B 302 316 -14 17.8 18.6 -0.8 
1969 332 370 -39 16.6 18.5 -1.9 
1970 437 435 2 19.3 19.2 0.1 
1971 450 461 -11 18.0 18.4 -0.4 
1972 419 505 -86 14.9 17.9 -3.2 
1973 444 553 -109 12.7 15.8 -3.1 
1974 652 843 -191 14.0 18.1 -4.1 
1975 815 1439 -624 15.4 27.2 -11.8 
1976 1075 1868 -793 16.5 28.6 -12.3 
1977 1539 2677 -1138 13.8 24.0 -10.2 
1978 2186 3625 -1439 10.4 17.3 -6.9 
1979 3015 4597 -1582 10.6 16.2 -5.6 
1980 3264 6066 -2802 7.6 14.1 -6.5 
1981 4539 9847 -5308 6.3 13.6 -7.3 
1982 4643 10132 -5490 5.4 11.7 -6.3 
1983 10241 15175 -4934 5.6 8.3 -2.7 
1984 22641 27485 -4844 8.4 10.2 -1.8 
1985 40311 47891 -7580 11.8 14.0 -2.2 
1986 73625 73326 299 14.4 14.3 0.1 
1987 111046 106987 4059 14.9 14.4 0.5 
1988 153791 149880 3911 14.6 14.2 0.4 
1989 214513 204161 10352 15.1 14.4 0.7 
1990 267347 263960 3387 13.2 13.0 0.2 
1991 390690 351515 39175 15.2 13.6 1.6 
1992 396143 510813 -114670 14.8 19.1 -4.3 
1993 664436 782872 -118436 23.7 27.9 -4.2 
Source: Brown (1972). 
GOG, Economic Survey (various issues). 
GOG, Quarterly Digest of Statistics (various issues). 
ISSER (1993). 
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Figure 1. Central government finances, 1960-1993 (as percentage of GDP) 
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in 1965, and averaging 1.3% of GDP in 1960-1967. After 1967, the budget moved into 
deficit and remained in deficit until 1985, except in 1970 when a surplus of some 0.1% 
of GDP was achieved. The deficits gradually widened from an annual average of 2.8% 
in 1971-1974 to 11.4% in 1975-1977 and ranged between 1.8% and 7% in 1978-1985. 
The relatively low deficit/GDP ratio of the 1971-1974 period was not due to any 
improvement in the share of government revenue in GDP, since the latter declined by 4 
percentage points during the period, but was due to the drop in the expenditure/GDP 
ratio. The expenditure/GDP ratio declined from 19.2% in 1970 to 15.8% in 1973. 
An interesting feature of the government finances during the 1970-1982 period was 
that the current revenue was insufficient to cover the current expenditure, part of which 
had to be financed from capital receipts. In the 1972-1978 and 1979-1982 periods, for 
example, current revenue could only cover some 54.9% and 56.9% of total expenditure, 
respectively, leaving large deficits to be financed from capital receipts (Kusi, 1991). The 
extremely poor fiscal performance in the period lies at the heart of the economic crisis 
the country faced. As the expenditure-revenue gap widened amid limited non-inflationary 
sources of finance, deficit financing became the principal source of the budgetary support, 
causing the share of government borrowing from the domestic banking system, mainly 
from the central bank, to increase from 49% in 1970 to 86% in 1982 (Kusi, 1991). The 
general monetization of the fiscal deficits and the resulting excess demand pressure 
accelerated the inflation rate, which caused a high over-valuation of the cedi and eroded 
real producer prices. This led to a drastic decline in agricultural production, especially 
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Table 2: Sources of government revenue 1960-1982 (in percent of total revenue) 
11 
Year Income and property taxes Foreign trade taxes Taxes on domestic Non-tax 
goods and services revenue 
Personal Company Total1 Import Export Total Excise Sales Total3 
income tax tax tax duty tax tax2 
1960 6.0 4.2 10.2 30.5 25.9 56.4 _ 7.7 12.8 20.6 
1961 7.7 5.7 13.4 36.5 19.9 56.4 - 6.9 12.3 17.9 
1962 8.6 6.3 14.9 37.2 15.9 53.1 - 5.8 16.3 15.6 
1963 6.4 4.8 11.2 37.0 16.4 53.4 - 7.4 18.8 16.5 
1964 12.8 12.3 25.1 30.2 13.9 44.1 - 6.2 17.3 13.5 
1965 10.0 9.5 19.5 36.5 7.0 43.5 - 6.8 26.4 10.7 
1966 9.5 10.5 20.0 29.4 6.3 35.7 - 9.8 32.5 11.9 
1967 8.4 11.3 19.7 25.3 13.4 38.7 - 7.4 29.8 11.8 
1968 9.4 10.2 19.6 18.6 23.3 41.9 - 7.4 28.2 10.4 
1969 7.8 10.7 18.5 18.0 29.8 47.8 7.7 9.4 22.2 9.8 
1970 6.7 7.7 15.4 18.3 36.1 54.4 6.7 7.4 19.1 11.1 
1971 6.3 7.2 15.1 23.8 26.8 50.6 6.6 7.3 22.4 11.9 
1972 8.9 8.2 21.3 13.6 28.5 42.1 10.0 7.5 21.7 14.9 
1973 9.3 10.2 23.9 16.1 21.4 37.5 12.3 8.3 26.2 12.5 
1974 8.4 10.3 20.1 16.5 27.0 43.5 9.9 4.6 21.8 14.6 
1975 10.3 12.8 25.3 11.9 23.0 34.9 22.2 5.1 27.3 12.4 
1976 8.7 11.5 22.3 12.0 25.7 37.7 25.0 4.9 29.8 10.2 
1977 10.4 9.2 20.1 14.5 32.0 46.5 15.8 3.6 23.8 9.5 
1978 8.5 7.0 15.7 15.9 43.2 59.1 10.9 3.3 16.7 8.4 
1979 10.2 8.4 20.2 11.9 36.8 48.7 15.4 3.0 24.3 6.8 
1980 11.7 11.8 26.1 13.1 12.2 25.3 31.8 6.4 39.0 9.5 
1981 14.8 13.6 29.5 14.6 0.1 14.7 33.5 14.4 47.9 7.9 
1982 16.1 14.3 32.3 17.4 0.1 17.5 30.7 5.3 35.6 14.5 
Source; Brown (1972) 
Government of Ghana, Economic Survey (various issues) 
Government of Ghana, Quarterly Digest of Statistics (various issues) 
'Includes other taxes on income and property 
includes excise duty up to 1968 
includes purchase tax, cocoa local duty and other output taxes 
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cocoa, and a worsening of the balance of payments situation. Thus the persistent fiscal 
deficits forced the government to absorb almost all the credit available in the economy, 
crowding out private borrowers and causing severe inflation. 
This series of problems is not, of course, unusual. The cycle of deficits leading to 
monetary expansion leading to misaligned real prices (especially exchange rates) is quite 
common (Younger, 1989), but the severe nature of the Ghanaian problem led to some 
rather unusual developments. As Figure 1 shows, beginning from 1978, government 
expenditure as a proportion of GDP, rather than increasing, began to decline sharply, 
reaching 8% in 1983. Thus the deficits persisted only because revenues also declined. 
Trends in revenue 
Government revenue has generally been on the increase since 1960. As a percentage of 
GDP, however, current revenue has declined since 1965, from a share of 20.1% in 1965 
to 5.4% in 1982 (Table 1). Both the tax and non-tax revenue contributed to the decline. 
As the entries in Table 2 show, indirect taxes were the most important sources of 
government revenue, accounting for more than two-thirds, on average, of the total 
government revenue in the 1960-1982 period, with tax revenue from international trade 
providing the bulk of it. The share of international trade taxes in total government revenue 
declined steadily, however, from 56.4% in 1960-1961 to 14.7% in 1981, caused by the 
decline in revenue from both import tax and cocoa export duty (export duty is assessed 
predominantly on cocoa exports). The import tax revenue declined from an average of 
35.3% in 1960-1963 to 10.7% of total revenue in 1982, while revenues from cocoa export 
duty declined sharply in the first half of the 1960s but resumed growth thereafter, reaching 
43.2% of total government revenue in 1978. Revenues from cocoa export duty, however, 
contributed nothing to total government revenue in 1981 and 1982 following the tripling 
in 1981 of the cocoa producer price and the complete removal of export duty on cocoa in 
1981 and 1982 (Kusi, 1991). The fall in import tax revenue was due to such factors as the 
sluggish growth in non-oil imports (caused by the fall in export earnings and an increase 
in import bills on oil following the 1973/74 and late 1970s oil shocks), and the artificially 
low value of imports in terms of domestic currency. Corruption and extensive tax evasion 
also played a significant part in the decline of the share of import tax revenue in the total 
revenue of the government. 
Taxes on domestic goods and services (excise duty and sales tax), which accounted, 
on average, for 15.6% of total government revenue in 1960-1964, had in 1977-1982 
more than doubled their contribution (Table 2). Indeed, had it not been for the general 
decline of the economy and the price control system, which resulted in large amounts of 
potential revenue being lost through parallel market transactions, tax revenue from the 
domestic goods and services would have expanded more than was realized. 
Table 2 also shows that tax receipts from income and property increased steadily, 
from 10.2% of total government revenue in 1960to21.3%in 1972, with some big jumps 
in 1964 and 1969. Thereafter, the share fluctuated between 15% and 25% until 1980-
1982 when the share jumped to an average of 29.3% of total revenue. Over this period. 
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the relative shares of the major components of income and property taxes, i.e., personal 
income and company tax, remained fairly stable, with each contributing some 9.3% of 
total revenue each year over the period. Personal income tax, most of it deductible at 
source through the pay-as-you-earn (PAYE) system was indeed the most reliable source 
of government revenue although its contribution to total revenue was low. On the other 
hand, revenue from company tax, property tax and self-employed tax tended to fall 
considerably short of its potential due again to extensive evasion and lags in assessment 
and collection. 
Non-tax revenue contribution to total revenue also experienced a serious deterioration 
in the period. From a share of 20.6% of total revenue in 1960, revenue from non-tax 
sources steadily declined to 7.9% in 1981, and averaged some 12% in 1960-1982 (Table 
2). This contribution was too low considering that the state was heavily involved in 
various directly productive ventures, with the total number of state-owned enterprises 
(SOEs) totalling 284 in 1980. Given the extensive involvement of the government in 
direct production, one would have normally expected the state enterprises to generate 
surpluses in the form of taxes, interests and dividend payments to finance additional 
public investment. Instead the SOEs became a drain on the government budget. Their 
poor performance was due to a multiplicity of factors, including the low level of capacity 
utilization, overstaffing, price control, poor financial management, corruption and the 
implicit assurance that state enterprises could always rely on government subsidies even 
in the face of continual losses (Huq, 1989). 
IV. Tax reform and revenue performance, 
1983-1993 
The tax reform programme 
In 1983 the Government of Ghana embarked on a series of fiscal and financial adjustments 
intended to stimulate economic recovery. Major faces of the adjustment process have 
been the reform of the tax system and measures to eliminate government budget deficits 
through expenditure rationalization. On the expenditure side, the policy matrix has been 
designed to raise capital outlays in the context of a rolling three-year investment 
programme, aimed at the rehabilitating the economic infrastructure and channelling more 
resources to operations and maintenance. On the revenue side, government policy has 
focused on tax reform with the view to removing the existing distortions and strengthening 
economic incentives, particularly incentives for savings and investment. As well, attempts 
have been made to enhance efficiency in the tax administration and equity in the overall 
tax system. 
The tax reform process can broadly be divided into three overlapping stages. 
First stage: Restoring the tax base 
In the initial stage of the fiscal adjustment, 1983-1984, the authorities felt that the tax 
revenue would benefit from the impact of the exchange rate adjustments on receipts 
from cocoa export taxes and import duties. In addition, the increased availability of foreign 
exchange from foreign donors was expected to stimulate import expansion and thus the 
base of import tax. The tax reform measures were, therefore, designed largely to restore 
the tax base, which had been seriously eroded by the persistent over-valuation of the 
domestic currency and the large divergence between the official prices (the base at which 
taxes were assessed) and market prices (at which transactions take place). The measures 
were also expected to widen the tax net, reduce evasion and lower the tax burden. To 
begin with, a multiple exchange rate system was introduced in April 1983. This system 
imposed surcharges on foreign exchange payments and bonuses on foreign exchange 
receipts, and effectively resulted in two exchange rates - 23.38 cedis = US$1 and 29.98 
cedis = US$1, respectively, from 2.75 cedis = US$1. In October 1983, the two effective 
exchange rates were unified, resulting in an effective exchange rate of 30 cedis = US$1. 
The exchange rate has periodically been adjusted since then, so that by 1993 it had 
reached 720 cedis = US$1. 
The pricing policy, which for a long time had been a mixture of administered (control) 
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prices for manufactured goods and market-determined prices for agricultural products, 
supported officially by minimum guaranteed prices for cocoa and cereals, was deregulated 
over the same period. For consumer goods, prices were allowed to fully reflect production 
costs plus profit margins, while for cocoa, maize, rice and palm oil, a flexible producer 
pricing system was adopted to maintain prices at levels that provided adequate incentives 
to producers. Further, budgetary subsidies for consumer goods and public utilities were 
gradually removed and fees, levies and charges for the various public sector services 
were revised upward as part of the new cost recovery measures. 
In addition to the exchange rate and price reform, the system for tax assessment for 
import duties, sales and purchase tax were revised to make the bases of dutiable goods 
reflect their full face value plus some surcharges. The basis for tax assessment for corporate 
income tax was similarly changed from profits of the previous year to actual income 
earned during the current year. In addition, the practice of advance payments of taxes at 
the beginning of each quarter, which had caused extensive evasion, was discontinued. 
Instead, corporate bodies and the self-employed were allowed to pay taxes at the end of 
the quarter. In the case of personal income tax, the lowest tax-free bracket was raised and 
the marginal rates lowered to reduce the average effective rates. 
Second stage: Strengthening production incentives 
The second stage of the tax reform process saw the introduction of an Investment Code 
(PNDC Law 116, 1985) and a new Minerals Law (Minerals Commission Law, 1986). 
The investment code provided for a wide range of tax incentives to domestic and foreign 
investors. The code identified four areas - agriculture, manufacturing, construction and 
buildings and tourism - as priority areas of investment. In these areas any enterprise 
engaging in any activity qualified for certain tax benefits and incentives. The details of 
the benefits and incentives granted under the code are provided in Table 3 and in addition 
to these there were many others. First, where an enterprise with priority status undertook 
or supported an approved programme of scientific research for the purposes of developing 
or advancing the said enterprise, the capital expenditure in respect of such research was 
fully tax deductible. Second, any enterprise located outside the Accra-Tema metropolitan 
area also qualified for income tax reduction ranging from 15% to 40% depending on the 
area of location. The code also provided for reduction or deferment of income tax payable 
by enterprises in areas lacking in basic infrastructure and where the enterprise undertook 
the costs of providing such infrastructure. 
On its part, the Minerals Law modified eight existing laws, clarified mining rights 
and set out new incentives for investors. The incentives included, among others, corporate 
tax allowances, capital allowances under which companies could write off between 40% 
and 100% of capital investment against tax, and permission for companies to use offshore 
bank accounts to service foreign loans, dividend payments and expatriate staff 
remuneration. 
Table 3: Tax incentives and benefits under 1985 investment code 
Incentive/benefit Agriculture Manufacturing Construction and building Tourism 
1. Custom duties -
import duty, saleslax, and 
other related charges 
2. Corporate income tax 
3. Depreciation or capital 
allowance 
Exempted on plant, machinery, Exempted on plant, machinery, 
equipment and accessories equipment and accessories 
imported exclusively to 
establish enterprise 
45% 
100% in the first year of 
investment 
imported exclusively to establish 
enterprise 
55% 
40% in the first year of 
investment and 20% in 
subsequent years 
Exempted on plant, machinery, 
equipment and accessories 
imported exclusively to establish 
enterprise 
55% 
50% in the first year of 
investment and 25% in 
subsequent years 
Exempted on plant, machinery, 
equipment and accessories 
imported exclusively to establish 
enterprise 
55% 
Plant and machinery - 50% in the 
first year of investment and 25% in 
subsequent years. Buildings - 20% 
in the first year of investment and 
10% in subsequent years 
4. Investment 
allowance 
5. Income tax rebates 
100% per annum 7.5% per annum 7.5% per annum 
(a) In the case of tree crops Rebates to the value of social (a) Exemption of staff from 
and livestock (excluding 
poultry): 75% in the first 
year, 50% in the second 
year, and 25% in the third 
year 
security contributions payable in 
respect of Ghanaian employees in 
excess of 100 
income tax relating to 
accommodation provided on 
building or construction site 
7.5% per annum 
Exempt from taxes and rates levied 
on buildings or properties for a 
period not exceeding 3 years 
(b) Exemption of staff from 
payment of income tax relating 
to furnished accommodation 
(c) Rebates to the value of 
social security contributions 
payable in respect of Ghanaian 
employees in excess of 20 
(b) Rebates to the value of social 
security contributions in respect 
of Ghanaian employees in excess 
of 75 
Source: Government of Ghana, Investment Code 1985 (PNDC Law 116). 
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Third stage: Enhancing tax efficiency and equity 
The focus of the tax reforms after 1985 was broadened to include the enhancement of 
efficiency of the tax administration and equity of the tax system. The pace of the tax 
reforms during this period was also increased and more attention was paid to the 
strengthening of private sector incentives. 
The effectiveness of tax administration is vital to attaining the objectives of every 
reform of the tax structure. Until 1986, the primary function of tax administration -
facilitating and monitoring taxpayer compliance and preventing non-compliance - had 
operated very inefficiently. The Customs, Excise and Preventive Service (CEPS) and the 
Internal Revenue Service (IRS) were unable to plan or carry out reforms to improve 
productivity. Qualified staff were difficult to attract and retain, morale was low, corruption 
was rife, and some staff held more than one job to compensate for the low wages. Low 
yield and high costs of taxpayer inspections and audits were a prominent feature of the 
tax administration. As a major part of the tax reform programme, a considerable number 
of steps were taken to strengthen the role of the revenue institutions in achieving the 
objectives of increasing revenue and changing the structure of the tax system to make it 
more efficient and equitable. The most dynamic step taken was the conversion of the IRS 
and CEPS into autonomous services with new organizational structures in line with the 
state-owned enterprises in 1986. At the same time, the remuneration, career path and 
other human resource issues of the new structures were reviewed and embodied in a 
Collective Work Agreement. The agreement also established new incentive policies 
including promotion procedures and training for the staff of the IRS and CEPS. These 
initiatives were aimed at generating from within the new organizations the necessary 
changes to improve productivity, particularly in the area of tax collection. 
Between 1986 and 1992, the IRS itself operated with a ministerial powers alongside 
the Ministry of Finance. In 1992, this full autonomy was partially reversed, and currently 
the IRS is headed by a director who reports to the Minister of Finance. The IRS, however, 
continues to have a supervisory control over the collection of revenue in the country. In 
terms of the functional reorganization of the revenue institutions, both revenue and 
expenditure accounting have been detached from the Treasury and coordinated only by 
regular returns submitted by the IRS and CEPS to the Secretariat, the Treasury and the 
Central Bank (Terkper, 1994). 
The move toward self-assessment of taxes has been slow as a result of the poor culture 
for filing returns in the country. Both the IRS and CEPS have therefore been reviewing 
their examination and audit practices. The IRS, for example, has begun a major review 
of its taxpayer master file, using names extracted from the presumptive tax scheme it 
operates for identifiable groups. The aim of this exercise is to further expand the tax base 
and improve the equity of taxation of self-employed persons in the country. The CEPS, 
lor its part, is to extend its more rigorous field audit of domestic firms to cover the 
operation of taxation of international trade. 
Upon the advice of the World Bank in 1989, the government took the initiative to 
computerize the tax administration management information systems and introduced a 
1 8 RESEARCH PAPER 7 4 
unique taxpayer identification number system. 
On the direct side, the aim of the corporate tax reform has been the gradual reduction 
of tax rates and the elimination of the distortions that arise from applying multitude of 
tax rules to different form of capital financing and sectoral incomes. In 1986, the corporate 
tax rate stood at 55%, with the exception of mining and manufacturing which faced a tax 
rate of 50%. By 1991, the applicable rate for real estate, manufacturing and construction 
had been slashed to 35%, while the rate for commerce, printing, and publishing was 
reduced from 50% to 35% in 1992. The rate applied to banking also went down, from 
50% in 1991 to 40% in 1992. By 1993, all rates had been reduced to 35%, with the 
exception of the rate applied to the mining sector. That rate was reduced to 35% in 1994, 
following the amendments to the Petroleum and Mining Law. In addition, the capital 
depreciation allowances provided under the 1985 Investment Code were extended to all 
enterprises in the manufacturing sector. 
Regarding capital gains tax, the rates, until 1989, were: assets in use under 5 years, 
55%; between 5 and 10 years, 45%; between 10 and 15 years, 35%; and between 15 and 
20 years, 25%. In 1990, these were changed to: assets in use under one year 50%; and 
between 2 and 20 years, 2.5%. In 1991, a flat rate of 5% was introduced to replace the 
progressive structure of the tax (GOG, 1988, 1991, 1992a), with income from mergers 
and acquisitions and publicly traded shares exempted from capital gains tax. The reduction 
was intended to reduce the impact of taxing the inflationary element in the disposition of 
assets. 
Prior to 1991, the tax on dividends was withheld at 30% and credited to any shareholder 
who filed a return at the end of the year. However, given the poor record of filing annual 
returns in the country, the withholding tax effectively became a 30% tax for most corporate 
distributions of profit, creating an element of double taxation due to the original taxation 
of corporate profits. In 1991, the withholding tax on dividend payments was converted 
to a final tax and then reduced from 15% to 10% in 1992 (GOG, 1991, 1992a). 
Significant changes were also introduced in the personal income tax system during 
this period. Although the changes were meant to discourage the spurious allowances 
granted under the former system, the fundamental goal was to lower the tax rates to 
minimize the disincentives to increased productivity and entrepreneurship. In place of 
the previous 17 tax brackets, 5 brackets were introduced in 1986 with new effective tax 
rates that provided substantial relief to the low-income earners (Table 4). The changes 
provided for a reduction of the top marginal rate of 60% (which previously applied to 
annual chargeable income exceeding 75,000 cedis) to 55% applicable only when a 
taxpayer's annual chargeable income exceeds 180,000 cedis. For those earning the 
minimum wage, the new rate of tax was only about half the rate paid in 1985. Taxpayers 
could also claim additional relief for expenses incurred in their children's education and 
contributions to pension and social security. Personal income tax relief to unmarried 
persons was also increased by 100%. For married persons filing separate tax returns, an 
increase of some 92% in tax relief was granted. Additional tax relief was also provided 
on end-of-service awards. 
The income tax burden was further lowered during the 1987-1993 period through 
substantial upward adjustments in personal allowances and the minimum tax-free income 
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threshold. Further increases in personal allowances at rates well in excess of expected 
inflation were allowed during the period. In addition, the base of personal income tax 
was broadened to include all allowances (comprising mainly allowances for housing, 
transport, leave and meals) paid to employees in both the public and private sectors. To 
offset the impact of this measure on disposable incomes, the top marginal rate of personal 
income tax was reduced from 55% in 1990 to 25% in 1991, and then to 35% in 1993 
(Table 4; GOG, 1991, 1994). By so doing, the top marginal rate of personal income tax 
was made equal to the corporate tax rate. It was thought that such unification would 
minimize the shifting of income by individuals under tax avoidance and evasion schemes. 
In 1992, the ranges of income covered by the tax bands were increased significantly to 
Table 4: Personal income tax schedule, 1985 and 1993 
1 9 8 5 1 9 9 3 
Taxable income 
(cedis) 
Marginal rate 
(%) 
Taxable income 
(cedis) 
Marginal rate 
(%) 
0 - 5,000 Free 
5.0 
7.5 
10.5 
12.5 
15.0 
17.0 
20.0 
23.0 
25.0 
30.0 
35.0 
40.0 
45.0 
50.0 
55.0 
60.0 
First 150,000 
Next 291,000 
Next 441,000 
Next 2,640,000 
Next 10,560,000 
Free 
5 
10 
15 
25 
35 
5,001 - 7,000 
7,001 - 9,000 
9,001 -11,000 
11,001 -14,000 
14,001 -16,000 
16,001 -19,000 
19,001 -22,000 
22,001 - 25,000 
25,001 - 30,000 
30,001 - 35,000 
35,001 - 40,000 
40,001 - 45,000 
45,001 - 50,000 
50,001 - 60,000 
60,001 - 75,000 
Above 75,000 
Exceeding 14,082,000 
Source: World Bank (1985); Government of Ghana (1993). 
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alleviate the burdensome effects of increased inflation and consolidation of all allowances 
with salaries. 
The tax reforms also affected the system of indirect taxation. The most important 
changes in this area included the lowering of tariff rates and achieving horizontal and 
vertical equity through a wider spread of the burden of indirect taxation. Beginning from 
1987, all excise duties on products other than petroleum, beverages and tobacco were 
abolished, with the revenue loss compensated for by an increase in the general sales tax 
rate from 10% to 20% and subsequently to 25%. In 1989, the rate was reduced to 22.5% 
and was lowered further to 17.5% in 1991. The sales tax rate on luxury items, however, 
was raised from 20% in 1987 to 35% in 1988, and remained at this level through 1993. A 
"super sales tax", ranging from 75% to 100% of the c.i.f and ex-factory cost, was 
introduced for very high-class luxury consumption goods in 1990. This was eliminateil 
from the tax structure in 1992 because, even though the tax was to be levied on all luxury 
consumption, its practical administration and implementation tended to apply only to 
imports, thus increasing the effective rate of protection for local industries (GOG, 1992a). 
Moreover, the high rates of the tax encouraged misclassification, evasion and avoidance 
(Terkper, 1994). Efforts were also made to replace the "ring" system of sales tax collection 
with a "credit" system. 
The windfall gains on petroleum sales were also converted to a specific excise duty 
on petroleum products. This was to ensure that revenue from petroleum products would 
accrue to the budget in the event of a rise in world oil prices. In 1988, petroleum tax rates 
were more than doubled and have since been marked upwards, reaching 35% of the 
average retail price in 1990. In 1992 and 1993 fiscal years, however, petroleum excise 
tax revenue fell short of the expected target due primarily to public resistance to the price 
increases. The government contends that the increases in petroleum excise tax should be 
regarded as only a part of a longer-term strategy to create a more equitable and broad-
based system of taxation. 
Regarding import duties, the view of the tariff policy was that the search for economic 
efficiency would make an across-the-board increases undesirable. For this reason, the 
special taxes levied on the local production of textiles, tobacco, alcoholic and non-alcoholic-
beverages, etc., were made to apply to imports of such items, beginning from 1988. In 
addition, import duty and sales tax applicable to local production of textiles were also 
made applicable to imports of similar goods. The special taxes and import duties were to 
represent the primary levies to protect local industries. However, in 1990, the special 
taxes were compressed into a uniform rate of 10% as the authorities realized the possibility 
of these variety of taxes perpetuating inefficiency in local production and rendering the 
local industries internationally uncompetitive. At the same time, the import licensing 
requirements were gradually removed and duty rates lowered by some 5 percentage points, 
reducing the primary import tariff rate on most goods to 25% in 1991. 
Revenue performance 
Perhaps the most glaring impact of the fiscal adjustment is the tremendous increases in 
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government revenue of all sources. These increases, in turn, contributed to the restoration 
of fiscal discipline. For example, the budget deficit was reversed from a deficit of 2.7% 
of GDP in 1983 to a surplus of 1.5% in 1991. However, it became difficult to sustain this 
impressive performance in 1992 and 1993. The budget moved back into a deficit, 
amounting to 4.8% of GDP in 1992, but this was reduced to 2.9% in 1993 (GOG, 1988, 
1994). 
Total government revenue grew by more than 26 times between 1983 and 1993, causing 
the revenue/GDP ratio to increase from 5.6% in 1983 to nearly 24% in 1993 (GOG, 
1994). Tax revenue increased from 4.6% of GDP in 1983 to 12.7% in 1987. Thereafter, 
the share declined gradually to 11.6% in 1990 before rising sharply to 18% in 1993 
(GOG, 1988, 1994). 
Of the non-grant sources of revenue, taxes on domestic goods and services showed 
the highest growth, with revenue from this source in 1993 exceeding 125 times the level 
in 1983. Revenue from taxes on foreign trade and transactions in 1993 were 35 times the 
level in 1983, while income and property tax revenue in 1993 was over 63 times its level 
in 1983 (ISSER, 1993). 
Between 1970 and 1980, taxes on foreign trade and transactions contributed, on 
average, some 44% of the total government revenue. By 1981, the contribution of foreign 
trade taxes to total revenue had fallen to below 15% (Table 2). The reform measures 
introduced after 1982, however, led to a sharp rise in the share of foreign trade taxes in 
total revenue to 48.3% in 1983 before declining steadily to 26.7% in 1993 (Table 5). The 
tax reform process also led to a big change in the relative shares of the components of the 
foreign trade taxes, i.e, import tax and export duty. Whereas in 1983 some 28.6% of the 
total tax revenue was derived from export duty, by 1993 the share of export duty had 
fallen to under 6%. On the other hand, the share of import tax receipts in total tax revenue 
increased from 19.7% in 1983 to 23.8% in 1990 before declining to 21% in 1993 (Table 
4). Thus, import tax replaced export duty as the major source of revenue originating 
from foreign trade after 1987. 
Since revenue from export duty is predominantly duty on cocoa exports, the decline 
in the former was due to the decline in cocoa duty revenue, which itself was due to the 
falling cocoa prices on the world market and the government's policy to pay a realistic 
producer price to cocoa farmers, particularly in 1981-1982 and the period after 1987. 
The world market price of cocoa dropped from 2,300 cedis per tonne in July 1987 to 
1,800 cedis per tonne in July 1988. The 1989 budget predicted that the 1988 price would 
fall and become stable at 1,400 cedis per tonne but due to the unleashing of accumulated 
stocks of cocoa by the major producers, prices tumbled to 1,045 cedis per tonne, causing 
over 25% loss of cocoa export receipts and thus cocoa export tax revenue over the period 
(Stryker, 1990). 
The tax reform also produced a noticeable impact on the revenue from and composition 
of taxes on domestic goods and services. In 1983, revenue from taxes on domestic goods 
and services accounted for some 17.1% of total government revenue. By 1993 the share 
had reached 34.3%, with most of the improvement occurring in the 1991-1993 period. 
Excise tax revenue which contributed 22.3% to total revenue in 1984, was in 1993 
contributing a mere 6.2%, with a dip in 1991 (Table 5). The decline in the excise tax 
Table 5: Sources of government revenue. 1983-1993 (percentage of total revenue) 
Year Income and property taxes International trade taxes Domestic goods and services taxes Non-tax 
Company 
revenue 
Personal Total' Import Export Total- Excise Petroleum Sales Total 
income tax tax tax tax tax tax tax 
1983 H H H I 16.9 19.7 28.6 48.3 14.8 2.3 17.1 17.6 
1984 17.7 14.8 21.5 36.3 22.3 - 2.4 24.7 21.2 
1985 B B B B B 11.3 19.1 16.4 22.8 39.1 17.8 - 3.0 20.8 21.0 
1986 WKKmIBI 13.1 19.8 17.5 19.2 36.8 14.2 9.0 3.8 27.0 16.3 
1987 • H H H 13.0 21.1 16.2 24.3 40.5 11.5 4.9 7.9 24.3 14.1 
1988 • • H 18.0 25.8 16.4 15.9 32.4 9.8 5.2 8.6 23.6 18.2 
1989 15.2 21.7 22.7 14.6 37.2 8.9 7.0 8.6 24.5 16.5 
1990 • B B M i 12.2 19.3 23.8 9.8 33.6 8.6 9.5 9.1 27.2 19.9 
1991 10.0 15.4 19.4 8.1 27.5 6.7 18.7 6.1 31.5 25.6 
1992 H H H H 10.3 18.3 21.4 9.7 31.1 8.1 20.9 6.3 35.3 15.2 
1993 8.4 16.6 21.0 5.8 26.7 6.2 22.7 5.4 34.3 22.3 
Source: Government of Ghana, Quarterly Digest of Economics i various issues >• ISSER (1993). 
1 Including property tax. interest and dividend tax. 
2 Including other trade taxes. 
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revenue was due to the re-classification of petroleum tax as a separate tax and the 
conversion of excise duties on all products other than tobacco and beverages to sales tax. 
The biggest increases in revenue over the period came from the contribution of petroleum 
taxes. Originally included as part of excise duty, taxes on petroleum products became 
full taxes in 1986 and, despite the authorities inability to raise the revenue anticipated 
from this source in 1993, revenue from petroleum taxes increased from 4.9% of total 
revenue in 1987 to 22.7% in 1993 (Table 5). These taxes thus appear to have replaced 
taxes on cocoa as the most important source of revenue for the government. 
The contribution of taxes from income and property to total tax revenue was similarly 
affected by the reform measures. In relation to total revenue, the share of taxes from 
income and property increased from 16.9% in 1983 to 21.1% in 1987, and then jumped 
to an all time record of 25.8% in 1988. Thereafter, the share declined gradually, reaching 
16.6% in 1993 (Table 5). Generally, the lack of growth in direct taxes in developing 
countries may reflect the relative strength of indirect taxes. However, in Ghana, it was 
also likely to be the result of the reductions in the marginal rates of personal and corporate 
taxes and the widening of the individual tax brackets. 
From the point of view of the relative shares of its components, the structure of income 
tax did not change much during the 1983-1993 period. It is important to notice, however, 
that revenue from company taxes increased its contribution to total tax revenue from 
7.4% in 1983 to 18% in 1988, while the share of personal income tax declined from 
8.6% to 6.7% (Table 5). This development reflected the availability of foreign exchange, 
which permitted large imports of essential inputs to support the recovery in the growth of 
industrial production, and the abolition of the price control system, which permitted 
producers to set prices at domestic market levels, thereby increasing sales value and thus 
companies' incomes and profits. The drop in the share of income tax revenue was largely 
the result of an income tax policy that sought to reduce the tax burden on personal incomes. 
Although taxes on incomes of self-employed persons expanded, the increases were very 
slow compared with the reduction in taxes on employees' incomes. 
V. Measurement of revenue productivity 
The relative composition of tax revenue has implications for revenue growth and stability 
when it is considered that taxes may be primarily mobilized to finance government 
expenditures, both recurrent and capital. A high revenue productivity is usually considered 
as one of the criteria of a good tax system in developing countries. This productivity is 
traditionally measured by the concepts of tax buoyancy and tax elasticity. 
Tax buoyancy and elasticity 
Changes in any individual tax revenue result from discretionary changes in the legal 
rates and rules governing the tax, and/or endogenous changes in the base on which the 
tax is imposed. The base is affected by, among others, variations in GDP. Therefore 
growth in tax revenue in response to GDP growth can be decomposed into two 
components: the "automatic" growth, and the growth resulting from "discretionary" 
changes in the tax rates and rules. The combined effect is known as the "buoyancy" of 
the tax. The automatic growth in the tax revenue alone, abstracting from discretionary 
changes, is the elasticity of the tax. A high tax elasticity, i.e., a tax elasticity coefficient 
of one or more, is said to be particularly desirable since it allows growth in expenditure 
to be financed by raising tax revenue without recourse to the politically unpopular decision 
to raise tax rates (Mansfield, 1972). 
Conventionally, the elasticity of total tax revenue in relation to income has been 
presented in aggregate models as a single number. However, it is more realistic to visualize 
the overall tax elasticity as a weighted average of the sum of the elasticities of individual 
taxes that respond in diverse ways to changes in income. This implies that an evaluation 
of the overall tax elasticity must commence with an examination of the individual tax 
elasticities. 
Symbolically, Mansfield (1972) has defined these elasticities as follows: 
AT, . Y 
Elasticity of total tax revenue to income: E 
TY AY T 
Elasticity of kth individual tax to income: E, 
AT, . Y k 
TkY AY Tk 
• Bk 
Elasticity of klh individual tax to base: ^ D . „ „ iM, AB, 1, k k Mk 
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Elasticity of k'h individual base to income: 'BkY 
^ l J L 
AY Bh 
where 
T = total tax revenue 
Tk = revenue from kth tax 
Y 
B, 
income (GDP) 
base of klh tax 
A = the discrete change in the variable associated with it. 
Given these definitions of elasticity, it follows that in a system of n taxes: 
jr, Y 
Tx (T, Y 1 Tk (ATk Y ) 
T, [ay T J T, lAF T k ) 
+ +LL[XLLJL 
(1) 
According to Equation 1, the elasticity of total tax revenue to income is equal to the 
weighted sum of individual tax elasticities (where the weights are the fractional 
distributions to total tax by each individual tax). 
The elasticity of any individual tax may also be decomposed into the product of the 
elasticity of the tax to its base and the elasticity of the base to income: 
-TkY 
AT B, \ 
AB, T„ v 1 k /y 
Combining Equations 1 and 2 gives 
H I 
AF B, k J 
(2) 
E. -Tx T,Y AB.T, 
r ABi Y_ 
VAY'BU T, ABkT, 
A Tn Bn 
A B ' T, n / 
^ j l J L 
ABk Y 
AY B, ' k y 
(3) 
which shows that the elasticity of total revenue to income in a system of n taxes depends 
on the product of the elasticity of tax to base and base to income for each individual tax, 
weighted by the importance of each tax in the overall tax system. 
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Estimation of tax elasticity and buoyancy 
Two methods have traditionally been employed to estimate tax elasticities. These are the 
historical time-series tax data (HTSTD) adjusted to discretionary tax measures (DTMs) 
and the unadjusted HTSTD with time trends or dummy variables as proxies for DTMs. 
The HTSTD adjusted to DTMs approach 
This approach attempts to eliminate discretionary tax changes (defined as the legal changes 
in the tax rates, tax bases, tax allowances and credits, and of tax administrative efficiency) 
from the HTSTD and then uses the adjusted HTSTD to estimate tax elasticity by the 
following single-equation model: 
log (T*) = log a + b, log (Bt) + e (4) 
where 
T* = adjusted HTSTD to discretionary tax changes 
B = tax base (or GDP in aggregate level) 
e = disturbance term 
bj = tax elasticity 
The underlying functional relationship of Equation 4 is given as: 
T* = aBbl (5) 
In adjusting the HTSTD to discretionary effects, the usual practice has been to use either 
the proportional adjustment (PA) technique or the constant rate structure (CRS) technique. 
The PA method was originally developed by Prest (1962) and has since been used by 
Mansfield (1972), Jeetun (1978), Sury (1985), Gillani (1986), Lambert and Suckling 
(1986), and Osoro (1993). In this method, a series of adjusted tax revenue is first obtained 
by subtracting from the actual tax revenue in each year the budget estimate of the revenue 
impact of discretionary changes in that year. The series is further adjusted by excluding 
the continuing impact of each discretionary change on future year's tax revenue as given 
in Equation 6. 
T =T ^2,3 ^1.2 
•j j-1,7 • T • (6) 1 j-1 .J3 2 
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where 
X. = the actual tax revenue in the jth year 
T.. = the jth year's actual tax revenue adjusted to the tax structure existing in the 
T. u = Tj-Dj (where Dj is the revenue effect - positive or negative - in the jth year 
of the discretionary tax changes in that year) 
The CRS method, on the other hand, requires data on income bracket (or commodity) 
rates and sufficiently disaggregated information on the growth and distribution of the 
reported tax bases (seeBahl, 1972; Andersen, 1973; Chelliah and Sheetal, 1974; Choudhry, 
1975). If such disaggregated information is available, then a constant rate base 
representing a hypothetical tax revenue under a system assumed to remain unchanged 
during the period under review can be constructed as follows: 
T* = adjusted HTSTD to discretionary changes 
R.() = the base-year statutory tax rate on the ith income bracket (or commodity) 
B.t = reported tax base in the ith income bracket (or commodity) in the tth year 
n = number of income brackets (or commodities) 
A major problem with the PA and CRS techniques is that they are unable to completely 
adjust the HTSTD to discretionary changes. For its part, the PA method uses budget 
estimates of discretionary tax changes that are difficult to obtain in many developing 
countries. The CRS technique, on the other hand, requires information on the distribution 
of tax bases by rate categories, which are also not readily available. The result is that the 
effective tax rates of the broad income brackets (or commodity groups) that are empirically 
used assume a constant interclass (on intergrouping) distribution of the tax base throughout 
the period under review. Clearly, the validity of this assumption weakens as the number 
of the income classes or commodity groups reduces due to aggregation. Furthermore, 
Hhdaie (1990) has pointed out that both the PA and CRS techniques incorporate only the 
discretionary tax changes resulting from changes in statutory tax rates, thereby ignoring 
the own- and cross-DTMs indirect responses of tax revenues and the impact of changes 
in the degree of tax evasion, administrative efficiency, tax bases, and tax credits and 
allowances. However, the technique suggested by Ehdaie itself suffers from the fate of 
incomplete adjustment for the DTMs, arising from the fact that the base year values used 
u 
year I 
(7) 
where 
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in his approach include the revenue effects of the DTMs. 
Choudhry (1979) has argued that in some situations, the CRS technique becomes 
inefficient. First, where a tax system has many progressive elements, the CRS technique 
does not guarantee that the estimated tax elasticity will be larger (or smaller) than that of 
the tax buoyancy even when discretionary changes produce negative (or positive) effects. 
Second, where tax bases grow at the same rate, there is the possibility that the elasticity 
estimate will fail to detect the effects of discretionary changes. 
The unadjusted HTSTD with proxies for DTMs approach 
This approach estimates tax elasticity directly from HTSTD using time trends or dummy 
variables as proxy for DTMs. Choudhry (1979) employs a divisia index method (DIM) 
in which time trends are introduced as proxy for DTMs in the tax revenue and tax base 
functions. The approach starts with the following function: 
log D(n) = log 
T{n) 
T(0) i-1 
B,{n) 
3(0). (8) 
where log D(n) is the index of discretionary tax measures. 
To obtain the elasticity estimates, the index of discretionary tax measures is adjusted 
by using the following formula: 
E = Z l 0 g D ( n ) 
' ' log B(n)l B(0) ( 9 ) 
where 
E t = tax elasticity 
ZT = tax buoyancy (obtained by regressing actual tax revenue on 
GDP using logarithm form equation) 
log D(n) = divisia index of discretionary tax revenue 
log B(n)/B(0) = index of automatic growth of the proxy tax base 
The problem with the DIM is that the formula derived to estimate the tax elasticity is 
a line integral and, in practical application, its discrete version is used, causing bias in 
the estimate of the revenue impact of discretionary changes. The bias can result in over 
or underestimating the tax elasticity depending on whether the discretionary tax changes 
produce positive or negative revenue effects. (For the derivation and proof of the formula 
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and its implications see Choudhry, 1979: 87-121). 
In an alternative approach, Chand and Wolf (1973), Khan (1973), and Artus (1974) 
incorporate one dummy variable (simple or mixed) as a proxy for each of the DTMs 
introduced during the periods of their review to estimate tax elasticity by means of a 
single-equation model of the form: 
n 
l o g ( T ) , = B0 + BL l o g ( B ) , + ] T B2ID, + U, (10) 
; = i 
where 
T = tax revenue 
B = tax base (or GDF in aggregate level) 
D. = dummy variable (simple or mixed) as proxy for the ith DTM taken during the 
period under review 
B, = tax elasticity 
The estimate of tax elasticity obtained from this approach may not be precise and 
reliable because of the creation of potential multicollinearity problems resulting from 
the inclusion of more than one dummy variable into the tax function. Ehdaie (1990) has 
argued that the degree of precision and reliability of the elasticity estimate are inversely 
related to the degree of multicollinearity, which in turn depends greatly on the time 
interval that existed between two successive discretionary actions taken by the tax 
authorities. This implies that obtaining a precise and reliable estimate of tax elasticity by 
means of this approach is empirically impossible, particularly when there are frequent 
discretionary tax changes during the review period. 
The approach adopted in this study to estimate the tax elasticities is the HTSTD 
adjusted to DTMs using the proportional adjustment technique. The starting point is 
liquation 2, which shows that the elasticity of any individual tax is a product of the 
elasticity of the tax to its base and the elasticity of the base to income. Accordingly, we 
proceed to estimate the elasticity of the tax to its base by using the traditional model as 
expressed in Equation 4. That is: 
log (T) = log a + b, log (B) + e 
where dlog(T*t)/dlog(B) = elasticity of the tax to its base. 
The elasticity of the base to income is similarly estimated by using a single-equation 
model: 
log (B) = log c + dj log (GDP)t + v (11) 
where dlog(Bi)/dlog(GDP)i = elasticity of the tax base to income 
Finally, the elasticity of the tax to income (ET) is obtained as : 
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Et = [dlog(T)/dlog(B)l[dlog(B)/dlog(GDP)] (12) 
The tax buoyancy is estimated by running an ordinary least squares regression of: 
Log (T.) = wo + w. log (GDP), + ut (13) 
where T. is the unadjusted tax revenue, and w. the tax buoyancy. 
VI. The elasticity of the Ghanaian tax system 
Proxy tax base 
Estimation of tax elasticity requires a specification of the potential proxy or tax bases 
and time- series data on the individual taxes and GDP. The World Bank (1984) in estimating 
the elasticity of the Ghanaian tax system for the period 1970/71-1980/81 considered 
GDP, private consumption expenditure, non-oil imports and cocoa export receipts as 
proxy bases for income tax, taxes on domestic production and consumption (i.e., excise 
tax and sales), import duty and export tax, respectively. In this study elasticities are 
estimated separately for company tax and personal income tax. For company tax, the 
specified proxy base is corporate current income (defined to include incomes from the 
sectors with the highest concentration of corporate activities, i.e., logging, manufacturing, 
mining, construction, water and electricity, and finance). The proxy base taken for personal 
income tax is current personal income (defined to include employees emoluments, both 
public and private, plus incomes from the trading and commercial sectors as proxy measure 
of the self-employed income). Since excise tax is levied only on manufactured goods in 
Ghana, the potential proxy base is income (value added) from the manufacturing sector. 
For sales tax, import tax and cocoa export duty, the proxy bases are the same as those 
specified by the World Bank, i.e., private consumption expenditures, non-oil imports 
(adjusted for capital import exemptions for the relevant years) and cocoa export receipts, 
respectively. 
Petroleum tax is excluded from the empirical analysis because prior to 1986 petroleum 
tax receipts were treated as part of excise duty revenue. Hence no time-series data on 
taxes on petroleum for the period leading to 1986 are available. This leaves us with time-
series annual data for eight years, which is too short for any meaningful tax elasticity 
estimation. 
Data 
Data for the empirical analysis were obtained from two main sources, the Government 
of Ghana and the International Monetary Fund. The Ghana Statistical Service (GSS) 
publishes Quarterly Digest of Statistics (QDS), which contains, among others, time-
series (annual) data on economic classification of central government revenue and national 
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accounts. In addition, the Ministry of Finance publishes annually the Budget Statement 
and Economic Policy of the Government, which usually contain data on the major sources 
of government revenue and expenditures. Data on individual and overall tax revenue. 
GDP and potential tax bases were obtained from these publications. The IMF publishes 
annually the Government Finance Statistics Yearbook, which also contains time series 
data on central government operations of member countries. Data from this source were 
used to supplement those obtained from the GSS Quarterly Digest of Statistics. 
Estimated tax buoyancies and elasticities 
Point estimates of tax buoyancies and elasticities for the major taxes and the overall tax 
system for the 1970-1982 and 1983-1993 periods are presented in Table 6. All the 
coefficients are significant at the 5% level and have the expected signs, except the 
coefficients of the export tax buoyancy and elasticity for the 1970-1982 period. The 
adjusted coefficients of determination ( r 2 ' s ) indicate that, in general, changes in the 
proxy bases explain over 80% of the changes in the tax revenues. The reported DW 
statistics also indicate the absence of autocorrelation in all the regressions. 
The overall tax system 
The coefficients in Table 6 show that the tax reform measures of the 1983-1993 perkxl 
had a tremendous positive effect on the productivity of both the individual taxes and the 
overall tax system. In the 1970-1982 period, all the individual taxes, except excise duty, 
had estimated buoyancies of less than unity, thereby causing the total tax system to have 
a buoyancy of 0.72. During the tax reform period of 1983-1993, however, all the individual 
taxes, except excise duty and cocoa export duty, showed buoyancies of more than unity, 
causing the buoyancy of the overall tax system to increase to 1.29. Compared with the 
1970-1982 period the tax buoyancy increased by 79.9% in the 1983-1993 period. 
The estimated income elasticity of the overall tax system for 1970-1982 was very 
low, 0.71, brought about because all the individual taxes, except for excise duty, had 
estimated elasticities of less than unity. The income elasticity of the excise tax was 
estimated at 1.16. In the 1983-1993 period, however, the estimated income elasticities 
for all the individual taxes, except the cocoa export duty, were more than unity, thereby 
causing the overall tax system to have an elasticity of 1.22. This represents an increase of 
69.5% over the estimated income elasticity for the overall tax system in the 1970-1982 
period. 
A comparison of the estimated buoyancies and elasticities of the overall tax system 
and of the individual taxes in each period shows small differences. For the overall tax 
system, the differences were 1.6% in 1970-1982 and 5.8% in 1983-1993. For the 
individual taxes, the differences were all less than 10% in both periods, except for excise 
tax in 1970-1982 where the elasticity exceeded the buoyancy by 10.6%. 
Some studies have attributed the differences between tax buoyancy and elasticity to 
the contribution of changes in the discretionary measures. In this study, the differences 
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Table 6: Estimated tax buoyancies and elasticities* 
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Tax category Buoyancy Elasticity Difference 
(percentage) 
Pre-tax reform period, 1970-1982 
Overall tax system 0.7197 
(11.4325), jp=0.89; DW=1.83 
Personal income tax 0.8879 
(9.8821); p = 0 . 9 1 ;DW=1.95 
Company tax 0.8095 
(5.9854); £2=0.84; DW=1.85 
Sales tax1 0.6876 
(3.9845); £2=0.82; DW=1.90 
Excise tax 1.0497 
(15.4403); £2=0.95; DW=2.10 
Import tax2 0.6042 
(11.6652); £2=0.89; DW=1.91 
Cocoa export duty -0.5010 
(-2.4039); £2=0.94; DW=1.79 
Tax reform period, 1983-1993 
Overall tax system 1.2948 
(25.6601); £2=0.93; DW= 1.99 
Personal income tax 1.1939 
(13.4427); £2=0.95; DW=2.00 
Company tax 1.3564 
(7.5155); £2=0.95; DW=1.91 
Sales tax* 1.7089 
(16.9875); £2=0.96; DW=2.10 
Excise tax 0.9173 
(8.2365); £2=0.89; DW=1.87 
Import tax** 1.3173 
(17.7865); £2=0.94; DW=2.00 
Cocoa export duty 0.8267 
(4.9876); £2=0.95; DW=1.85 
Percentage change in 1983-1993 
Overall tax system 79.9 69.5 
Personal income tax 34.5 25.0 
Company tax 67.6 61.8 
Sales tax1 148.5 133.4 
Excise tax -12.6 -14.4 
Import tax2 116.7 105.0 
Cocoa export duty 265.0 243.6 
' t-values in parentheses; " On domestic manufactured goods; *** Includes import duty, sales and purchase 
tax on imported goods. 
0.7082 1.5979 
(10.7714); £2=0.89; DW=1.88 
0.8664 2.4214 
(9.1102); £2=0.89; DW=2.10 
0.8176 -1.0006 
(5.9989); £2=0.89; DW=2.10 
0.6801 1.0908 
(3.9324); £2=0.79; DW=1.93 
1.1612 -10.6221 
(17.3209); £2=0.97; DW=2.00 
0.5853 3.1281 
(9.4518); £2=0.87; DW=1.91 
-0.5221 4.2116 
(-2.9675); £2=0.98; DW=1.91 
1.2200 5.7764 
(25.0023); £2=0.93; DW=1.98 
1.0828 9.3063 
(13.9879); £2=0.93; DW=1.98 
1.3227 2.4866 
(7.5002); £2=0.95; DW=1.90 
1.5877 7.0936 
(14.5671); £2=0.95; DW=1.99 
0.9941 -8.3724 
(9.1007); £2=0.90; DW=1.92 
1.2072 8.3580 
(16.9987); £2=0.94; DW=1.99 
0.7498 9.3020 
(3.9987); £2=0.93; DW=1.91 
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Table 7: Budget estimates of tax revenue and actual outcomes, 1970-1993 
Year Budget estimates Actual Outcomes Comparison 
(million of cedis) (million of cedis) 
Total 
revenue 
DTMS Revenue 
(unadjusted 
Revenue Difference 2 as 
(adjusted) (3-4) % of 1 
5 as 
% of 3 
3 as 
% of 1 
5 as 
% of 2 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
1970 437 62 388 336 52 14.2 13.4 88.8 83.9 
1971 481 42 396 359 37 8.7 9.3 82.3 88.1 
1972 459 28 357 331 26 6.1 7.3 77.8 92.9 
1973 462 47 388 347 41 10.2 10.6 84.0 87.2 
1974 640 113 557 467 90 17.6 16.1 87.0 79.6 
1975 704 66 713 653 60 9.4 8.4 101.3 90.9 
1976 940 102 965 874 91 10.8 9.4 102.7 89.2 
1977 1057 41 1389 1349 40 3.9 2.9 131.4 97.6 
1978 1437 22 2002 1980 22 1.5 1.1 139.3 100.0 
1979 3025 460 2810 2424 386 15.2 13.7 92.9 83.9 
1980 3639 373 2955 2630 325 10.2 11.0 81.2 87.1 
1981 4087 509 4182 3734 448 12.4 10.7 102.3 88.0 
1982 4380 89 3968 3881 87 2.0 2.2 90.6 97.8 
1983 10117 3689 8434 6368 2066 36.5 24.5 83.4 56.0 
1984 19527 6656 17830 13637 4193 34.1 23.5 91.3 62.9 
1985 39900 13242 31841 20056 11785 33.2 37.0 79.8 89.0 
1986 71281 23664 61587 42419 19168 33.2 31.0 86.4 81.0 
1987 92494 14471 95400 82521 12879 15.6 13.5 103.1 89.0 
1988 115853 12271 125779 114735 11044 10.6 8.8 108.6 90.0 
1989 171219 27264 179139 155965 23174 15.9 12.9 104.6 85.0 
1990 221201 25237 214254 192045 22209 11.4 10.4 96.9 99.0 
1991 325713 66875 290529 239035 51494 20.5 17.7 89.2 77.0 
1992 364263 44240 336096 297607 38489 12.1 11.4 92.3 87.0 
1993 540608 122707 503395 406456 96939 22.7 19.3 93.1 79.0 
Source: Government of Ghana, The Annual Estimates (various issues); Quarterly Digest of Statistics (various 
issues); ISSER (1994: 95) 
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niust be interpreted with caution because they don't capture fully the effects of the 
discretionary tax changes. As the entries in Table 7 show, for both the 1970-1982 and 
1983-1993 periods, the budget estimates of discretionary tax changes (column 2) differed 
substantially from the actual discretionary outcomes (column 5), even for periods such 
as 1975-1978,1981 and 1987-1989, when the actual tax outcomes (unadjusted) exceeded 
the budget estimates. Also the share of the budget estimates of discretionary changes in 
total budget estimates (column 6) differed from the share of the actual discretionary 
changes in actual tax revenue (column 7). This underscores the fundamental weakness 
of the PA method employed to adjust the tax revenues for discretionary changes. 
The fact is that individual tax systems, tax revenue, tax bases and GDP are all 
interrelated. Variations in an individual tax revenue can therefore be traced not only to 
variations in its own tax system through discretionary tax changes, but also to endogenous 
changes in its base. The base, in turn, is endogenously affected by changes in its own and 
other tax systems through the price mechanism, changes in investment, savings and income 
(Ehdaie, 1990). While the PA method may succeed in capturing the direct effect of the 
discretionary changes in statutory tax rates, the indirect and cross effects of such 
discretionary changes on its own tax system and on other tax systems and changes in the 
degree of tax evasion and administrative efficiency cannot be captured, thereby leaving 
the actual tax outcomes to be inadequately adjusted for the discretionary changes. 
The revenue performance in 1970-1982 relative to the performance in 1983-1993 
was low and lies at the heart of the estimated low buoyancies and elasticities during the 
period. As Table 8 shows, beginning from 1970 tax revenue declined steadily from 16.0% 
of GDP to 4.1 % in 1982. Thereafter, the declining trend was not only reversed but assumed 
an increasing trend, reaching 9.2% of GDP in 1985 and averaging some 12% in 1986-
1992. In 1993, tax revenue reached 18.0% of GDP, the highest level recorded since 
1960. This development implied that whereas an increasing proportion of the incremental 
GDP was transferred to the government in the form of revenue in 1983-1993, a decreasing 
proportion of the incremental GDP was ceded to the government as tax revenue in the 
1970-1982 period. 
The low productivity of the tax revenue in the 1970-1982 period could be attributed 
to a number of factors. The first relates to the collapse of the country's foreign trade 
during the period. Tax revenue from international trade declined from 10.5% of GDP in 
1970 to 0.9% in 1982, brought about mainly by the decline in cocoa production and 
export (the major foreign exchange earner at the time) and the resultant compression in 
imports. Cocoa production declined by about 55.6% between 1970 and 1983, so despite 
the government's increasingly high "tax" on cocoa exports implied by the low real 
producer prices, the overall tax revenue from cocoa exports declined. The reduction in 
imports, caused by the decline in exports reduced the tax base for import tax, leading to 
a decline in import tax revenue as well. 
Apart from the reduction in both the export and import volume, the over-valuation of 
the cedi also contributed to the decline in real tax revenues in the 1970-1982 period. The 
exchange rate for the cedi was fixed at 1.15 cedis=US$l in February 1972; this remained 
in force until 1978, causing the cedi to become highly over-valued. Taking 1973 as a 
base year, for example, Christney (1985) estimated that by 1978 the cedi was over-
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Table 8: Sources of government revenue, 1960-1993 (as percentage of GDP) 
Year Personal Company Excise Sales Petroleum Import Export Nontax Total 
income tax tax tax tax tax tax tax revenue revenue 
1960 0.92 0.64 - 1.18 - 4.68 3.97 3.94 15.33 
1961 1.21 0.90 - 1.08 - 5.73 3.13 3.67 15.72 
1962 1.28 0.94 - 0.86 - 5.55 2.37 3.90 14.90 
1963 0.98 0.73 - 1.12 - 5.64 2.50 4.27 15.24 
1964 2.12 2.05 - 1.03 - 5.05 2.29 4.09 16.63 
1965 2.01 1.91 - 1.36 - 7.33 1.40 6.08 20.09 
1966 1.60 1.78 - 1.65 - 4.96 1.06 5.84 16.89 
1967 1.47 1.97 - 1.30 - 4.42 2.35 5.97 17.48 
1968 1.66 1.81 - 1.31 - 3.31 4.13 5.54 17.76 
1969 1.29 1.78 1.28 1.56 - 2.98 4.95 2.75 16.59 
1970 1.29 1.49 1.30 1.44 - 3.54 6.98 3.31 19.35 
1971 1.13 1.30 1.20 1.32 - 4.29 4.82 3.95 18.01 
1972 1.33 1.21 1.49 1.11 - 2.02 4.24 3.49 14.89 
1973 1.17 1.29 1.56 1.05 - 2.04 2.71 2.85 12.67 
1974 1.18 1.44 1.38 0.64 - 2.31 3.78 3.26 13.99 
1975 1.58 1.97 3.42 0.80 - 1.84 3.55 2.27 15.34 
1976 1.44 1.90 4.11 0.80 - 1.98 4.24 2.01 16.48 
1977 1.43 1.26 2.17 0.50 - 2.00 4.40 1.99 13.75 
1978 0.88 0.73 1.13 0.34 - 1.65 4.51 1.18 10.42 
1979 1.09 0.90 1.65 0.32 - 1.27 3.93 1.52 10.68 
1980 0.89 0.90 2.42 0.49 - 0.94 0.93 1.06 7.63 
1981 0.93 0.85 2.09 0.90 - 0.83 0.01 0.64 6.25 
1982 0.86 0.77 1.65 0.29 - 0.57 0.00 1.23 4.79 
1983 0.48 0.41 0.83 0.35 - 0.76 1.59 1.15 5.57 
1984 0.63 0.78 1.87 0.42 - 0.92 1.80 1.95 8.37 
1985 0.89 1.33 2.10 0.81 - 1.40 2.67 2.56 11.76 
1986 0.92 1.89 2.05 1.08 1.29 1.87 2.77 2.54 14.41 
1987 1.09 1.93 1.72 1.77 0.74 1.71 3.62 2.32 14.90 
1988 1.06 2.63 1.43 1.92 0.81 1.62 2.33 2.84 14.64 
1989 0.89 2.30 1.34 2.39 1.06 2.29 2.20 2.66 15.13 
1990 0.83 1.61 1.13 2.50 1.25 1.77 1.29 2.77 13.15 
1991 0.70 1.51 1.02 2.04 2.83 1.77 1.23 4.08 15.18 
1992 0.99 1.53 1.19 2.16 3.09 1.90 1.44 2.51 14.81 
1993 1.63 1.98 1.47 3.25 5.36 2.91 1.36 5.70 23.66 
Source: Brown (1972); GOG, Economic Survey (various issues); GOG, Quarterly Digest of Statistics (various 
issues); ISSER (1993). 
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valued by 250%, implying that exporters using the official channels were effectively 
taxed while importers received substantial premiums. In 1978, the cedi was devalued by 
58%, but this did little to stem the appreciation of the real exchange rate so that by 1982 
the exchange rate was overvalued by 816% (World Bank, 1984). This high over-valuation 
of the cedi caused incentives to shift from export to import trade and also encouraged 
black market and smuggling of export commodities to neighbouring countries. As imports 
became extremely cheaper, demand for them far outstripped the available foreign 
exchange, forcing the government to resort to import controls through a system of import 
licensing and administrative controls. In the end, only a very small volume of imports 
was possible. Meanwhile taxes were levied on the cedi value of imports and exports, but 
these values were not inflating with the rest of the economy so taxes based on them 
significantly eroded in real terms. 
The reluctance of the authorities to adjust the exchange rate to its equilibrium level 
was accompanied by a system of price controls. In April 1982, the official price list, 
published in two volumes, contained 1,900 prices, with many items having separate 
control prices depending on size, make and quality. The consequence of the price control 
system was that demand for all goods exceeded supply. The incoherent attempts to enforce 
the price control policy, coupled with the over-valued exchange rate and absence of taxes 
and subsidies to reflect in prices the actual scarcity, caused a significant expansion of the 
black market economy (where transactions are non-taxable), forcing the structure of the 
formal markets in the economy to collapse. The impact of the price control system, the 
over-valuation of the exchange rate and the resultant black market economy was tragic. 
It deprived the government not only of large amounts of foreign exchange through official 
channels, but much needed revenue in the form of export duty, import tax and sales tax. 
Il also affected the distribution of income in the society. 
Finally, tax evasion, laxity in tax collection, and the significant time lag between tax 
assessment and tax collection in an environment of rapid inflation were also important 
factors explaining the decline in tax revenue in proportion to GDP in the pre-reform 
period. 
The high productivity of tax revenue in the 1983-1993 could be attributed mainly to 
the effects of the exchange rate reform. Since the over-valued exchange rate had been the 
principal cause of the collapse of the country's international trade, and thus the bases of 
the traded goods taxes, the government introduced a major reform in this area, as we saw 
earlier. The exchange rate reform was supported by the introduction of foreign exchange 
auctions and foreign exchange bureaus (where foreign exchange could be freely bought 
and sold) as well as price and import liberalization, which effectively ended price controls 
and abolished the import licensing system. These developments worked to remove the 
restrictive mechanisms and market distortions existing in the economy, thereby restoring 
the tax bases that had been extensively eroded in the 1970-1982 period. The measures 
also signalled a shift of incentives to domestic production and export, which contributed 
significantly to the recovery in the export trade, particularly the export of gold, timber 
and many nontraditional goods. The devaluations also meant a larger local currency 
value of both exports and imports, thereby increasing the traded goods tax base. They 
also allowed the government to increase the producer price of cocoa, which encouraged 
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more cocoa exports (and a larger tax base), and to reinstate the cocoa export duty that 
had been abolished in the 1981-1982 period. In addition, the foreign exchange auctions 
together with the scrapping of the import licensing system contributed to the stimulation 
of imports, and thus the import tax revenue. 
Apart from the exchange rate, trade and price liberalization, the increased flow of 
foreign loans and remittances from abroad also contributed to the increased flow of 
imports, and thus the base for import tax. The import recovery also allowed not only 
essential raw materials, capital goods and spare parts needed to improve the rate of capacity 
utilization, particularly in the manufacturing sector, but also stimulated domestic trailing 
activities, thereby expanding domestic production and consumption and increasing the 
bases of both excise and sales taxes. 
Finally, the better enforcement of the tax laws and pursuance of measures aimed at 
maximizing the efficiency of tax collection contributed significantly to the high tax revenue 
productivity in 1983-1993. In particular, the conversion of the two revenue institutions. 
IRS and CEPS, into autonomous organizations with improved employment conditions 
for their staff and freedom from the civil service bureaucracy, enabled the institutions lo 
attract requisite professional staff needed to tackle the challenges of administration brought 
by the improved tax system. This had a positive impact on revenue mobilization, especially 
in the period after 1986. 
Personal income tax 
The estimated income tax buoyancy for the 1970-1982 period was 0.89 and the elasticity 
was 0.87. Compared with the corresponding coefficients of 1.19 and 1.08 for the 1983-
1993 period (Table 6), one observes that the income tax performance was low in 1970-
1982. Although personal income tax increased steadily from 1.3% of GDP in 1970 to 
1.6% in 1975, it declined sharply thereafter, reaching under 0.5% of GDP in 1983 (Table 
8). 
The low productivity of personal income tax during the 1970-1982 period stemmed 
partly from the low taxation of non-wage income earners, especially income earners in 
the trading and commercial sector, but mainly from the decline of real wages of employees 
in the formal sector. The World Bank (1984) analysis of income tax collection according 
to sources for the period 1977/78-1979/80, for example, indicates that wages and salaries 
of employees in the formal sector accounted for 84% of the total income tax collection, 
while the self-employed and standard assesses contributed only 16%. Since in an 
environment of rapid inflation profits keep pace or move ahead of the price increases 
while wages and salaries lag behind, one would have expected that income tax from the 
self-employed workers, the majority of whom were in commerce and trade, should have 
risen relative to tax on wage income, but the use of official control prices in computing 
the profits and taxable income of the self-employed workers precluded their tax liability 
to inflate with the economy. The ease with which income tax on salaried workers is 
assessed and collected, i.e., based on the PAYE system, provided another explanation for 
the less concerted attention to taxes on self-employed incomes. Although the share of the 
self-employed income tax in the total income reached 58% in 1982/83, this was not due 
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to any improvement in tax collection from this source since the period witnessed a drastic 
decline in the share of tax on wage incomes. 
The decline in wages and salaries of workers in the formal sector, resulting from the 
government's minimum wage legislation, was largely to blame for the low buoyancy 
and elasticity of income tax from 1970 to 1982. Governments in Ghana have implemented 
minimum wage legislation since 1960, when the wage rate was fixed at 0.65 cents per 
day. Since then, the rate has been revised upwards several times, but the policy not only 
failed to maintain the real wages of workers at subsistence levels, it also discriminated 
more against skilled personnel. Since 1974, increases in the nominal wages failed to 
keep pace with the rate of inflation. The result was that, in nominal terms, the average 
wage rate rose at an average of 28.4% in 1974—1983. In real terms, however, average 
wages actually declined at the rate of 13.3% per annum (Ewusi, 1987). Besides the 
compression of the wage structure, the differential between the highest and lowest paid 
in the civil service, where most wage and salary earners were employed, fell to 1.8:1 
compared with the ratio of 10:1 in the private sector (Jonah, 1989). Given the severity of 
the situation, many skilled personnel left the civil service to work in neighbouring 
countries, where conditions were relatively better, or left their professions for trading, 
causing the base of employee income tax to shrink. The existence of a multitude of non-
taxable allowances (leave, canteen, transport, housing, inducements, medical, education, 
clothing, etc.) was also an important factor underpinning the low buoyancy and elasticity 
in the period. 
Compared with the estimated coefficients for the 1970-1982 period, the buoyancy 
and elasticity of personal income tax increased by 34.5% and 25%, respectively, in the 
19S3-1993 period, much less than the growth experienced in the overall tax system over 
the same period. The modest growth in personal income tax revenue in 1983-1993 was 
a re flection of the personal income tax policy of the period, which was generally directed 
at reducing the income tax burden. Starting from 1986, the income tax brackets were 
reduced from 16 to 5. In addition, the top marginal rate of 60%, which in 1985 applied to 
annual chargeable income exceeding 75,000 cedis, was successively reduced, reaching 
35% in 1993 and applicable to annual taxable income exceeding 2,206,242 cedis in 
terms of 1985 value. These were in addition to the substantial tax reliefs granted to the 
low-income earners and married couples. For example, in 1985, the standard personal 
relief for a married couple was 6,500 cedis. By 1993 this had increased to 23,500 cedis in 
terms of 1985 value. Over the same period, the tax rates applied to the lower income 
earners were also revised downwards. Figure 2 compares the effective income tax rates 
in 1985 to the rates applied in 1993. As the figure shows, the income tax reform reduced 
the progressivity of the effective tax rates. Whereas in 1985, the effective tax rates ranged 
from 6% for incomes up to 25,000 cedis to 47% for incomes of 240,000 cedis and above, 
the corresponding effective tax rates in 1993 were from 0.1 % to 9.4%, implying relatively 
lower real income tax liabilities in 1993. The decline in the effective tax rates was even 
more substantial for the higher income earners. For example, the effective tax rate paid 
by a married person with an annual income of 240,000 cedis was 47% in 1985. In 1993, 
a married person with an annual income equivalent to 240,000 cedis (at 1985 prices) 
paid an effective tax of less than 10%, representing a reduction of some 37 percentage 
points between the two periods. The effect of these reforms was that the share of income 
tax revenue in GDP increased by only 0.6 percentage points, from 0.5 in 1983 to 1.1 in 
1988. Thereafter, the share declined to 0.7% in 1990 before rising to 1.6% in 1993 (Table 
8). 
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Figure 2. Effective income tax rates, 1985 and 1993 
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Company income tax 
The estimated company income tax buoyancy and elasticity for the 1970-1982 period 
were 0.81 and 0.82, respectively. In 1983-1993, the buoyancy and elasticity were 
estimated at 1.36 and 1.32, respectively, showing a vast improvement in the productivity 
of company income tax revenue in the period. For the buoyancy, the increase was 67.6% 
and for the elasticity it was 61.8% in 1983-1993 (Table 6). The recovery in the company 
tax revenue in 1983-1993 was reflected in its share in GDP. As a percentage of GDP, 
company tax revenue generally declined in the 1970-1982 period. As Table 8 shows, the 
share declined slightly from 1.5% of GDP in 1970 to 1.2% in 1972 and thereafter increased 
sharply to an average of 1.9% in 1975/76. After this period, the share declined sharply, 
reaching 0.4% of GDP in 1983. After 1983, however, the share increased steadily to 
2.6% in 1988, dropped to 1.5% in 1991 and picked up again, reaching 2.0% in 1993. 
The poor .performance of company tax revenue in 1970-1982 reflected the sharp 
decline in industrial production, and thus the base of company tax, following the general 
decline of the economy over the period. Although Ghana's industrial capacity is relatively 
large, diverse and long-established compared with most other African countries, it has 
largely been underutilized. Excess capacity has therefore been a common feature of the 
sector, and the situation was exacerbated by the high investment activity in the 1974-
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1976 period. The average rate of capacity utilization during the period 1970-1977 was 
in the range of 43%-52%. Capacity utilization worsened in the late 1970s and early 
1980s as the country's ability to import raw materials and spare parts diminished. By 
1982, the average capacity utilization had dropped to 21%, with the decline particularly 
acute in the textile subsector (World Bank, 1985). Correspondingly, manufacturing output 
remained stagnant between 1970 and 1977 after a dip in 1973/74, and then declined 
sharply in the 1977-1980 period. The sector's output is estimated to have declined by 
8.3% in 1980/81, followed by a further decline of over 20% in 1981/82 (World Bank, 
1985). Thus, far from being a leading sector generating economic growth, the 
manufacturing sector became a lagging sector with huge underutilized capacity. 
The immediate cause of the precipitous decline in industrial production in the 1970-
1982 period was the acute shortage of imported inputs, arising from the inability of the 
economy as a whole to generate sufficient foreign exchange and the high costs of 
manufacturing production, which prevented the sector from meeting its own foreign 
exchange needs through export earnings. The decline of the export sector during the 
period made the tight foreign exchange situation much worse. The difficulties in obtaining 
vital imported spare parts and raw materials forced manufacturers to restrict output. 
Industries based on domestic resources also found themselves in equally bad shape as a 
result of the strong policy bias against agricultural production. 
Apart from the acute shortage of essential imported inputs, the price and distribution 
controls that characterized the period and tended to favour trade also discouraged industrial 
production. The price controls interfered extensively with the ability of producers to 
raise ex-factory prices to the level of the domestic market prices. In this way, the policy 
reduced the protection and profits of domestic industries to the extent that most reported 
manufacturing statistics often showed production costs that exceeded the value of sales. 
This development not only prevented manufacturers from sharing in the scarcity value 
of the goods they produced, it also adversely affected revenue mobilization from company 
tax, excise duty and sales taxes. 
The high revenue performance of company tax in 1983-1993 stemmed from the modest 
recovery in industrial production, brought about through the availability of foreign 
exchange, which allowed an increased inflow of imported raw materials, spare parts and 
capital goods needed to maintain and replace the ageing capital stock. As a result, capacity 
utilization in large and medium manufacturing enterprises increased from 18% in 1984 
to 41% in 1989 while industrial production grew at an annual average rate of 7.7% from 
1984 to 1993 (GOG, 1992b). The abolition of price and distribution controls also 
contributed to the stimulation of industrial production as it allowed producers to "charge 
what the market could bear", thereby ensuring a balance between sales revenue and 
production costs. It also removed delays and uncertainties in industrial activity and 
enhanced producers' ability to assure the banks of adequate cash flows (necessary to 
obtain credit). 
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Sales tax 
Sales tax buoyancy was estimated at 0.69 and elasticity at 0.68 in 1970-1982. Comparing 
the corresponding coefficients of 1.71 and 1.59 in 1983-1993 (Table 6), one observes a 
tremendous increase in the productivity of sales tax revenue in the latter period. The 
estimated coefficients for the 1983-1993 period represent an increase of 148.5% for the 
buoyancy and 133.4% for the elasticity, making sales tax revenue the one that experienced 
the most improvement in 1983-1993. As a percentage of GDP, sales tax revenue declined 
steadily in the 1970-1982 period. Thereafter, the share in GDP increased sharply to 
1.1% in 1986 and averaged 2.3% each year in 1987-1993. Indeed, the shares of sales tax 
revenue in GDP in each year of 1989-1993 were double the shares in each year in 1970-
1982 (Table 8). 
The poor performance of sales tax revenue in 1970-1982 was due in part to the decline 
in real private consumption expenditures, the base on which the tax is imposed, but more 
to the poor administration of the sales tax itself. Following the general decline of the 
economy, per capita real income declined by about 30% between 1970 and 1983 (World 
Bank, 1984). Accompanied by worsening income distribution and growing unemployment, 
the incidence of absolute poverty increased, which in turn caused a sharp decline in real 
private consumption expenditure and thus sales tax revenue. The use of controlled ex-
factory prices as a basis for computing sales tax liability, particularly during the high 
inflation period of 1977-1982, also contributed to the erosion of the value of sales, the 
base on which the tax was imposed. To this one must also add tax evasion and laxity in 
tax collection, the two endemic tax problems that characterized the period. 
The recovery in the growth of sales tax revenue in 1983-1993 was attributed to three 
main factors. First, there was a significant improvement in the tax collection brought 
about by the restructuring of the tax collection machinery and the whole tax administration. 
This was supported by the abolition of the price control system, which had created a 
wide divergence between the official ex-factory prices (the base at which sales taxes are 
assessed) and the market price (the base at which transaction takes place). Second, the 
conversion into sales tax of excise duties levied on all locally produced goods, except for 
tobacco and beverages, also contributed significantly to the high buoyancy of the sales 
tax revenue, particularly in the period after 1987. Third, the recovery of real GDP growth 
in 1984—1993 allowed for the first time in many years sustained gains in real private 
income per capita of about 2.8% a year. These gains permitted an expansion in real 
consumption expenditures, the base of sales tax, of about 2.5% each year during the 
period (Kapur et al„ 1991). 
Excise duty 
The estimated buoyancy of 1.05 for excise tax in 1970-1982 was higher than the 
corresponding coefficient of 0.92 in 1983-1993. Similarly, the estimated elasticity of 
1.16 for 1970-1982 was higher than the 0.99 elasticity estimated for the 1983-1993 
period. These figures indicate a decline of 12.6% in the buoyancy and 14.4% percent in 
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the elasticity in 1983-1993 (Table 6). As a percentage of GDP, revenue from excise tax 
was the only one that experienced a decline in 1983-1993. The share of the excise tax 
revenue in GDP increased from 1.3% in 1970 to 1.7% in 1982, with a sharp jump in 
1980 and 1981. In 1983, the share declined to 0.8% of GDP. Thereafter, excise tax revenue 
resumed growth, reaching 2.1% of GDP in 1986. After 1986, however, the share declined 
steadily, reaching 1.2% in 1992 (Table 8). 
Throughout the 1970-1986 period, excise taxes were imposed on few manufactured 
products, thereby making the collection relatively easy and evasion relatively difficult. 
In addition, revenue from petroleum tax until 1986 was counted as part of excise tax 
revenue, thus causing the productivity of excise tax to increase as prices of petroleum 
products rose, especially in the late 1970s and early 1980s. The decline in the buoyancy 
and elasticity in the 1983-1993 period was attributed to the abolition of all excise duties 
on products other than beverages and tobacco in 1987 and the successive reduction in the 
duty rates of the affected goods. The conversion of the excise tax on petroleum to a de 
facto petroleum tax was also a factor accounting for the low productivity of excise tax 
revenue in the period. 
Import tax 
The impact of the tax reform measures was also seen in the performance of import tax 
revenue. The estimated import tax buoyancy and elasticity in 1970-1982 were both less 
than unity, 0.6 and 0.59, respectively. Compared with the corresponding coefficients of 
1.32 and 1.21 estimated for the 1983-1993 period (Table 6), the productivity of the 
import tax revenue was low in 1970-1982. This poor performance could be attributed to 
1) the compression of imports resulting from the acute foreign exchange shortages that 
characterized the period, 2) the valuation of imports at the artificially over-valued exchange 
rate, 3) the use of specific duty rates rather than ad valorem rates in computing duties 
payable, and 4) evasion and laxity in tax collection. 
The high productivity of the import tax revenue in 1983-1993 was due to the success 
of the measures taken to address the import tax problems in the 1970-1982 period. First, 
the substantial inflow of foreign exchange, arising from the expansion in exports, increased 
foreign loans and remittances and the abolition of the import licensing system, allowed 
a complete recovery of imports. Second, the successive devaluations of the exchange 
rate contributed substantially to the restoration of the import tax base. Third, the 
replacement of all specific duty rates by the ad valorem duty rates together with the 
establishment of the uniform tariff rate for most imports (which greatly simplified the 
collection process) allowed more import tax to be collected. The increased tax collection 
was also supported by improvement in the tax administration. 
Table 9 shows the impact of the changes in the import tax rates, exchange rate 
adjustments and changes in imports (valued in US dollars) on the share of import tax 
revenue in GDP. The entries in the table show that the major source of growth in the 
import tax revenue's share in GDP in 1970-1982 was imports valued in US dollars. In 
11 out of the 13 years, imports contributed positively to the changes in import tax revenue/ 
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Table 9: D e c o m p o s i t i o n of s o u r c e s of c h a n g e In i m p o r t tax /GDP ra t io (pe rcen tages) 
YEAR ER/P ETR MGS 1/GDP TOTAL 
1970 -32.4 34.2 132.3 -41.0 100.0 
1971 -21.2 24.9 122.7 -26.4 100.0 
1972 -14.9 20.7 97.5 -3.4 100.0 
1973 -288.1 -188.6 657.3 -80.6 100.0 
1974 -192.1 -125.7 471.5 -53.7 100.0 
1975 114.6 8.9 35.4 -58.9 100.0 
1976 -346.0 293.5 102.3 50.3 100.0 
1977 -513.0 392.6 243.2 -22.8 100.0 
1978 64.6 8.7 -15.5 42.2 100.0 
1979 -42.4 154.3 3.2 -15.1 100.0 
1980 134.9 34.8 -72.1 2.4 100.0 
1981 463.9 -352.4 12.2 -23.6 100.0 
1982 64.7 -54.9 108.3 -18.1 100.0 
1983 124.5 -140.2 98.6 17.1 100.0 
1984 591.8 -60.9 -384.9 -45.9 100.0 
1985 54.3 -27.9 85.7 -12.0 100.0 
1986 50.0 3.1 64.2 -17.3 100.0 
1987 -232.5 371.6 -90.1 51.0 100.0 
1988 25.5 -286.0 256.5 104.1 100.0 
1989 11.3 97.7 5.2 -14.3 100.0 
1990 54.1 101.7 -68.6 12.8 100.0 
1991 166.5 -85.5 -127.3 146.3 100.0 
1992 253.9 -243.9 146.3 -56.3 100.0 
1993 89.7 -18.2 39.9 -11.3 100.0 
* figures may not add up to exactly 100 due to rounding to one decimal point. 
Methodology: 
Define MT = ETR . ER .MGS 
MT/(P.GDP) = (ETR. ER . MGS ) / (RGDP) 
= ETR . ER/P .MGS . 1/GDP 
Alog (MT/PGDP) = Alog ETR + Alog (ER/P) + Alog (MGS) + Alog (1/GDP) 
where MT = import tax revenue; ETR = effective tax rate; ER = nominal exchange rate (cedis= US$1); 
MGS = imports valued in US dollars; P = GDP deflator; GDP = gross domestic product (nominal). 
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GDP ratio. The average annual contribution was estimated at 146.5%. The contribution 
of the changes in the real exchange was negative during the period. As the table shows, 
the exchange rate over-valuation was the major source of deterioration in the import tax 
revenue performance in the period. The exchange rate adjustment, however, was the 
dominant factor explaining growth in the import tax revenue in 1983-1993. In 10 of 
those 11 years, adjustments in the exchange rate positively affected the import tax revenue, 
so that its contribution reached an annual average of 108.1 %. The contribution of changes 
in the effective tax rates in 1983-1993 was largely negative, caused mainly by the lowering 
of the import duty rates on standard and luxury goods and the abolition of some special 
duty rates and duties on building materials in 1991. Although the change from specific to 
ad valorem duty rates in 1990 contributed to the growth of import tax revenue, its effect 
was largely offset by the lowering of the duty rates. 
Cocoa export duty 
The estimated buoyancy and elasticity of the cocoa export duty in 1970-1982 were all 
negative, -0.5 for buoyancy and -0.52 for elasticity. Although the estimated buoyancy 
and elasticity in 1983-1993 were positive, they were less than unity, 0.83 for buoyancy 
and 0.75 for elasticity (Table 6). The poor performance of the cocoa export duty in 1970-
1982 could be explained in part by the decline in domestic production and exports and 
partly by the fall in world market prices. Cocoa production fell gradually from 409,000 
metric tonnes in 1970 to 329,000 metric tonnes in 1977, then dropped sharply to a mere 
179,000 metric tonnes in 1983. At the same time, the spot price of Ghana's cocoa in 
London markets increased from £381 in 1970 to £2,935 in 1977 and then dropped sharply, 
reaching £1,033 in 1982. As a result of both the decline in export volume and export 
prices, the share of cocoa export duty in GDP declined sharply, from 7% in 1970 to 0.9% 
in 1980, with some jump between 1976 and 1978. Since 1983, the cocoa export duty's 
share in GDP has gradually increased, reaching 3.6% in 1987 and averaging 1.6% in 
1988-1993 (Table 8). 
The decline in cocoa production and export in 1970-1982 was due in part to the 
ageing stock of cocoa trees, widespread diseases, bad weather and the shortage of farm 
labour and inputs, but mainly to the extremely low producer prices paid to farmers. 
Cocoa farmers received 37% of cocoa export receipts in 1970. The farmers' share 
subsequently increased to 44% in 1972/73, but dropped to 29% in 1974/75. Thereafter, 
the farmers' share ranged from 26% to 47%, except for 1981 and 1982 when world price 
declined and the cocoa export duty was abolished (Stryker, 1990). The low prices paid to 
cocoa farmers was due to three main factors. First, the over-valuation of the exchange 
rate throughout the 1970-1982 period made it difficult for the Ghana Cocoa Marketing 
Board (GCMB), which receives its revenues in foreign exchange from cocoa exports, to 
pay a high cedi price to the farmers. Second, the GCMB itself became inefficient, leading 
to increased "marketing costs" (payments to GCMB). Finally, the government steadily 
increased the (implicit) tax on cocoa exports by holding producer prices down (Younger, 
1989). 
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The improvement in the cocoa export duty in 1983-1993 was the result of theand 
rehabilitation and restructuring of the cocoa sector (with foreign aid) that commenced in 
1983 and exchange rate reforms that allowed significant increases in producer prices. 
The improved price incentives and rehabilitation of cocoa farms led to the recovery in 
cocoa output and export, which reached 305,000 metric tonnes in 1993 (Economist 
Intelligence Unit, 1994), and to a gradual decline in exports to neighbouring countries 
through illegal channels. 
VII. Mobilization of additional revenue 
The tax reform measures introduced in the 1983-1993 period succeeded in improving 
revenue generation and enhancing efficiency of tax administration and the equity of the 
tax system. The tax administration has been greatly improved, the tax base broadened 
and the whole structure of taxation rationalized. The reforms also made the tax regime 
less distortionary and strengthened economic incentives, especially incentives to promote 
savings and investment. Despite these significant gains, government revenue as a 
proportion of GDP is still too low compared with the average obtained in the developing 
world, and even with the average for Africa. As the entries in Table 10 show, total 
government revenue (including grants) averaged 14.6% of GDP in 1986-1991, compared 
with the average of 24.4% for Africa and over 25% for developing countries. The 
comparative shares of tax revenue shown in the table imply that it is possible for a 
developing country to raise its tax revenue into the range of 11 % to 25% of GDP, but that 
it is only the industrial countries that will be able to sustain tax revenue shares in excess 
of 30% of GDP. The 11.9% tax revenue's share in GDP for Ghana is at the lower level of 
the developing countries threshold, indicating that from a macroeconomic standpoint 
there is ample scope for further increases in tax revenue. The problem with Ghana's 
resource mobilization is that revenue as a percentage of GDP has fallen short of budgeted 
levels in each year since 1986. While revenue targets have been met in absolute terms, 
higher than expected inflation has led to higher nominal GDP and thus lower revenue-
GDP ratios, suggesting the existence of room for further revenue expansion. 
But what are the revenue enhancement options available to the country? 
Value-added tax (VAT) 
The major option available for raising additional revenue is the introduction of VAT to 
replace the existing sales tax. VAT is an attractive tax because it is a powerful source of 
revenue that does not significantly distort businesses' and consumers' decisions. The 
record of VAT in generating large amounts of revenue quickly and in comparatively 
painless fashion has earned it the reputation as a "money machine" (Gillis, 1990). By 
design, VAT improves compliance as the collection of the tax revenue through a paper 
trail (invoices) helps auditors to detect evasion. The non-distortionary (neutrality) 
properties of VAT are attributable to the provisions that effectively free investment goods 
Some forms of intersectoral disparities are unavoidable, but they can be minimized through 
appropriate choice of exemptions and rate structure. 
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Table 10: International comparison of revenue profile, 1986-1991 
(period average as percentage of GDP) 
Region/country Total revenue Tax revenue Non-tax revenue Grants 
Industrial countries 34.9 31.2 3.1 0.6 
Developing countries 25.4 17.1 6.4 1.9 
Africa 24.4 18.1 3.9 2.4 
Asia 20.4 14.2 4.3 1.9" 
Europe3 34.6 24.8 9.1 0.7 
Middle East 27.3 10.7 13.1 3.5 
Western Hemisphere 20.4 16.4 3.0 1.0 
Ghana 14.6 11.9 1.8 0.9 
Source: Computed from IMF (1993). 
a excluding industrial countries. 
b excluding the Pacific Islands of Tonga, Vanuatu, Solomon Island and Papua New Guinea. 
In the 1960s, only 9 countries in the world levied VAT; now more than 90 countries 
do so. Of the OECD countries, only USA and Australia do not use VAT. All the Latin 
American countries now have VAT, as do the ex-communist economies of Eastern Europe. 
In the developing world, VAT has become the consumption tax choice. For the majority 
of the countries for which data are available, revenue from VAT constitute some 20% of 
total revenue, while the share of VAT in GDP is higher than 3% (Tait, 1991; Gillis, 
1990). 
The Government of Ghana recognized the need for VAT in its 1993 budget and began 
preparations for its introduction. A bill introducing VAT was discussed and approved in 
Parliament in October 1994, but its implementation was deferred until March 1995. 
Initially fixed at 17.5%, the VAT was expected to double the 1994 sales tax revenue. 
Although sales tax showed the highest tax buoyancy in the 1983-1993 period, its structure 
poses serious problems for further reductions in tax rates and revenue expansion, stemming 
principally from the narrow base of the tax, as it is applied only to imports and locally 
manufactured goods. The exclusion of the distribution and services sectors does not 
make the tax comply fully with its description as a tax on all consumption expenditures. 
It also compromises its fairness to all income-earners. In addition, the sales tax's multiple 
rates compound the existing problem of compliance. Further, the sales tax regime makes 
the country's exports non-competitive since it does not permit recovery of indirect taxes 
paid by most exporters on their inputs. It is the need to remove these deficiencies 
(distortions) and to improve the indirect tax revenue and its administration that made the 
introduction of the VAT the critical option. 
Another important reason for adopting VAT in Ghana is related to the country's desire 
for accelerated economic growth. The VAT will allow the country to rely less on income-
based taxation, which tends to discriminate against saving and investment, in favour of 
current consumption. Furthermore, the export-development strategy would be facilitated 
by the VAT, which does not tax exports and provides tax refunds for the inputs embodied 
in export production. Moreover, the broadly based VAT would enhance the stability of 
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revenue and reduce the volatility associated with some of the commodity-based revenue 
such as cocoa and petroleum taxes. 
A major problem that is likely to confront the administration and implementation of 
the VAT system in the country is the poor culture of record keeping. The concept of VAT 
calculation involves the keeping of records of so many factors that help in determining 
the charge to tax, qualification for exemptions, zero rating refunds, etc. Most commercial 
business houses are owned by illiterates who hardly keep proper records of their business 
transactions. There are also many dishonest business people who would want to falsify 
their records to beat the tax administrators for personal aggrandizement (Kassim, 1994). 
The artificial price increases that may occur as a result of the acts of some greedy business 
people is also an issue to confront under a VAT system in Ghana. Besides, the public, 
especially the business sector, will need to be well informed and properly educated on 
the need for VAT, pros and cons, the items for exemption, and all that VAT is about, 
through seminars, workshops, and television and radio communications. 
The government recognized some of the potential problems that VAT introduction 
will bring but did nothing about it. What the government did was to entrench in the VAT 
Act severe penalties for false declarations, falsifications, illegal alteration of VAT invoices 
and evasion. For example, the Commissioner for VAT was granted the authority under 
part IV of the Act to impose penalties not exceeding three times the amount of VAT not 
paid or falsified in addition to a forfeiture of any goods involved or to seek through the 
courts an imprisonment term of not exceeding two years, or both, for offenders. On the 
question of public debate, consultation and education on VAT, nothing was done in the 
country. The discussions on VAT were limited to members of the Parliament. It was 
therefore not surprising that the VAT introduction created uncertainties and suspicion in 
the minds of the general public, leading to violent public protest and eventual withdrawal 
of the tax for reconsideration. The public concern was not so much about the introduction 
of VAT as a new tax system, but more with the lack of public consultation and discussion, 
the timing of its introduction, and the initial high rate of 17.5% All these point to the fact 
that tax policy and tax laws must conform to the society's commitment to the rule of law. 
This means not only that the system should be effective in the enforcement of tax laws, 
but also the citizens' right to be taxed should be protected. In other words, taxation must 
be founded on a moral consensus around the need to nurture the tax system as a vital 
component of national existence and in the valued ownership of all people in the country. 
Property tax 
Local governments in Ghana have traditionally depended on central government grants 
to cover most of their expenditures, which have constrained their ability to provide and 
maintain local infrastructures. As part of the central government's fiscal adjustment, 
many local government grants have been reduced, and the local governments are becoming 
increasingly dependent on locally generated revenue sources. Of the many locally raised 
revenue sources, property tax is the most important and effective. Unfortunately, this is 
one area that the tax reform process never touched. In fact, there had been no general 
revaluations between 1960 and the late 1980s, when the property tax was based on 
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construction costs and its administration taken over by the central government. Although 
a well established rating system had operated in the main urban centres of the country 
for some time, by the mid 1980s the tax base in Accra, for example, was well out of date. 
The last revaluation was done in 1960. Inflation since then had been high and almost half 
of the properties were missing from the valuation roll (Keith, 1993). As a result, 
supplementary valuations of new properties have failed to keep pace with growth, causing 
the share of property tax revenue in total revenue to become increasingly insignificant. 
The reason for the neglect of property tax in Ghana, and indeed throughout the world, 
is that it is a politically sensitive issue. The sensitivity stems from the fact that the tax is 
very visible, effective and difficult to avoid. Besides, annual action is required to keep 
the tax buoyant. The visibility of the tax and the effect of gearing, i.e., that a small 
increase in a local government budget can trigger a big increase in the property tax rate, 
magnify the political difficulties. 
Since property tax will for some time remain an important source of local government 
revenue, action is needed in this area. More recently, a twinning arrangement between 
the Ghana Valuation Division and the UK Valuation Office has enabled a full revaluation 
of all properties in Accra to be accomplished. The exercise led to an increase in the 
number of properties under valuation from 46,000 to 250,000, thereby increasing the tax 
base 800-fold (Keith, 1993). Similar efforts are being undertaken in four other cities. 
This exercise needs to be extended to all the urban areas to ensure a full exploitation of 
this potential local government revenue source. 
Income tax 
With respect to personal income tax, the satisfaction or compliance with the equity 
principle implies that the tax base should necessarily and sufficiently include all sources 
of income. Moreover, the rate of taxation should change according to different levels of 
income rather than income sources. While tremendous successes have been achieved in 
adjustments in the effective income tax rates (effective tax rates have declined for all 
income groups), the equity principle appears to have faltered. The income concept 
primarily adopted in the country is monetary income. Thus conceptually and operationally, 
non-monetized incomes are not reckoned as taxable incomes and are therefore not brought 
under the tax net. Personal income taxes are levied on only earned incomes, while a 
greater percentage of people in the subsistence and informal sectors who do not monetize 
their incomes are not covered. Similarly, most of the people whose incomes are monetized 
have other incomes in kind - petrol coupons, free accommodation, free medical care, 
etc. Investigations revealed that private medical practitioners and lawyers whose incomes 
are for all practical purposes higher than most employees in the formal establishments 
pay lower taxes. A comparison of their life styles with the taxes they pay shows that 
these groups under-declare their incomes either by deliberately doing so or because the 
incomes are not monetized. 
The present conceptualization of income in the country coupled with the poor 
accounting records in the formal sector suggest that if nothing is done the fiscal authorities 
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are for a long time going to negate other facets of taxation and concentrate on revenue 
generation through indirect taxation. Clearly, this would not permit a maximum 
mobilization of revenue from the existing tax handles. The solution is for the definition 
of income for the purposes of income tax policy to be reviewed. This exercise would 
enable the tax authorities to extend the tax net to cover incomes earned in the private 
sector and other informal activities besides the incomes generated in the formal 
government sector. In the meantime, the standard assessment tax systems as applied to 
artisans and the Ghana Road Transport Union are policy steps in the right direction. To 
make it more efficient and equitable the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning 
must consider undertaking a further study of the incomes of these and other groups so as 
to be able to develop commensurate tax schedules that would not defeat equity and 
incentive principles. The need to extend this tax system to encompass the millions of 
individuals, particularly those in the trading business, and smaller enterprises whose 
engagement in the formal sector is vital for revenue growth should also be considered. 
This could be facilitated by simple rules and procedures, and a minimum of fiscal 
complexity. 
With respect to company tax, the ability to generate maximum revenue from this 
source depends on the complete recovery of the industrial sector, which in itself depends 
on the speed and strength of the private sector's response to the macroeconomic reforms. 
To date, the private sector's response appears to be not fully satisfactory, reflecting the 
initial poor state of the economy and the time needed to rebuild confidence in the 
sustainability of the new policy measures and in the outlook of the economy as a whole. 
The protracted economic decline from 1970 to 1982 left the private sector in a state of 
virtual devastation, from which it will require a length of time to recover. In particular, 
the dearth of medium-term financing, the rudimentary state of the capital market and the 
general weaknesses in financial intermediation make it difficult for companies to find 
means of financing other than short-term bank credit. The generally low profitability of 
many private firms and the low overall domestic savings also limit the prospects for self-
financing (Kapur et al., 1991). The policy measures introduced, especially after 1990, 
should contribute to the alleviation of many of the problems facing the private sector, 
and thus attract more private investment. In particular, these include the reduction in the 
tax on capital and investment income, including lowering the company tax rate from 
45% to 35% in 1993, and reforms in the capital gains tax. Together with the extension of 
the capital allowances provided under the investment code to all manufacturing enterprises 
and the establishment of the stock exchange and divestiture of state enterprises, these 
constitute a major reform that should attract positive investment response. 
Tax administration 
Despite the many changes that the tax reforms have brought about, some problems of 
institutional infrastructure of tax administration still exist. First, the audit capacity of the 
tax authorities calls for serious improvement. An extensive audit of enterprises in both 
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the formal and informal sectors of the economy to provide comprehensive information 
relating to potential taxpayers and their sources and levels of income has never been 
done. Clearly, this has serious implications for tax revenue mobilization, as the 
administration is unable to provide indicators of critical inputs to estimate taxable bases. 
For example, in 1987-1989, tax revenue out-turns consistently exceeded the original 
estimates. The experience of 1986 also stands out vividly in terms of both revenue and 
expenditure estimates. The ex ante revenue estimate amounted to 85 billion cedis against 
an estimated expenditure of 90 billion cedis, producing a deficit of 5 billion cedis. And 
yet the budgetary out-turns produced a surplus. To increase the capacity of the tax 
administration and enhance human resources development, the current initiative to 
introduce computerization is an exercise in the right direction. The examination of 
taxpayer records needs to be stepped up with a view to establishing accurate tax liability. 
The Internal Revenue Service would have to take concrete steps towards reviewing the 
operations of identifiable bodies, who in the past have considered the periodic tax payments 
based on standard assessment as final tax. 
With the present inflationary pressures, tax deferment and/or evasion must be checked. 
These practices benefit the violator or tax dodger. In the case of outright evasion, the 
budgetary authorities lose massively, whereas in the case of deferment, the taxpayer 
enjoys benefits equivalent to the prevailing nominal rate of interest on personal loans. 
Thus the gains from tax deferment become costs to the government budget. They also 
breed inequality among taxpayers with different possibilities of deferment. To prevent 
these tax malpractices, the tax authorities would need to fight with an efficient and honest 
tax administrative capacity as well as strong sanctions to deal with tax defaults, deferment 
and evasion. Tax penalties would have to be high enough to cover costs and ensure 
equity. At the same time the legal capacities to enforce compliance would need to be 
expanded and strengthened. A new penal law designed to reduce the burden of evidence 
required before the tax authorities can proceed with penalties needs to be introduced to 
strengthen the hand of the authorities in prosecuting tax evasion and tax fraud. This legal 
modification must allow for more flexibility in the application of fiscal secrecy, however, 
while permitting the tax authorities to publish (if need be) the list of defaulting taxpayers. 
Generally, the tax administrators need to improve their own managerial capacities through 
actions in the areas of collection management, audits and internal control, and personnel 
policy. 
Tax policy 
A major issue of concern with the taxation system in Ghana is that the specific objectives 
of tax policy are not always clear. It is usually difficult to make out whether the tax 
policies are designed to mobilize additional revenue or to afford the fiscal authorities the 
opportunity to realize a broader set of socio economic objectives, e.g., income 
redistribution, incentive to industrial development, stabilization of prices, redressing of 
external disequilibrium, and prohibition of the consumption of certain goods and services. 
Indirect taxes, for example, have been the major source of revenue and to compensate 
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lor the revenue loss from income and property taxes, they have used extensively. But a 
tax policy that aims at mobilizing revenue from indirect sources should recognize the 
elasticities involved. A tax policy that aims at eschewing imports must realize that it 
cannot generate revenue at the same time. In fact, the introduction of the "super sales 
tax" on selected imports in the 1990 budget and many of the tax incentives granted under 
the 1985 Investment Code smack of this inconsistency. The point is that tax policy is 
multifaceted and the various facets may not be compatible in orientation. It is therefore 
very important for the tax authorities to make clear the objectives of their tax policies so 
as to be able to introduce fiscal instruments that are consistent with the objectives. 
VIII. Conclusion 
The rapid expansion of government expenditures amid low revenue growth in the period 
leading to 1983 led to serious fiscal imbalances in the Ghanaian economy. This 
development created the need for a larger share of the private sector's resources to be 
ceded to the government as taxes to finance the increased expenditures. Since 1983, 
therefore, the tax system of Ghana has undergone a fundamental reform, aimed at 
improving revenue generation and maximizing the efficiency of collection. Tax reform 
has thus been used as an instrument for raising the revenue productivity of the tax system. 
Estimates of buoyancies and income elasticities of individual taxes and the overall 
tax system, based on empirical evidence, show that the tax reform process contributed 
greatly to the growth of revenue productivity from 1983 to 1993. This is evident in the 
elasticities of more than unity for the major taxes and of the total tax system. In addition, 
the overall tax system and all the major taxes, except excise tax and cocoa export duty, 
showed buoyancies of more than unity. The estimated buoyancies of the overall tax 
system, income tax, sales tax and import tax were all greater than their respective 
elasticities, showing the positive role that the reform has played in the revenue productivity 
growth. In particular, the successive devaluations supported by the abolition of price 
control and import licensing systems permitted a recovery in international trade and thus 
the bases of import tax and export duties. The measures also allowed an increased inflow 
of much needed imported inputs to rehabilitate the devastated industrial sector and improve 
capacity utilization. The resultant increases in industrial production led to increases in 
industrial income and thus company and sales tax revenues. Finally, the simplification of 
the import tariff rates and the complete overhaul of the whole tax administration also 
allowed more taxes to be collected, thereby contributing to the productivity of the tax 
system. 
The empirical results have important implications for the Ghanaian fiscal system. 
They show that a tax system that is responsive to economic growth is desirable since it 
enables tax revenue to grow automatically without resorting to the politically difficult 
task of raising tax rates. In this regard, emphasis must be placed on those taxes that have 
high revenue elasticities. In the Ghanaian case, all the individual taxes investigated for 
the 1983-1993 period had relatively high elasticities, except for personal income tax 
which had elasticity of just above unity. The policy implication here is that the authorities 
must gradually move away from income-based taxation, which discriminates against 
saving and investment, in favour of the consumption-based taxes. Already the country is 
well underway toward liberalizing and reducing the tax burden on income. This policy 
must be pursued relentlessly. 
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Comparing the revenue performance over the review period with that of other countries 
in Africa and elsewhere, however, the study found that Ghana lies at the bottom threshold 
of the performance range for the developing countries, suggesting the existence of room 
for further revenue expansion. Various revenue enhancement options, including 
introducing VAT to replace the existing sales tax, revaluing properties to broaden the 
base of property tax, reviewing the definition of income for the purposes of income tax, 
and further improving the tax administration to improve tax collections and combat evasion 
and fraud, were found to be available for use by the tax authorities. Above all, the 
authorities must recognize that tax policy and tax laws must conform to the society's 
commitment to the rule of law. That is, the system must not only ensure an effective and 
equitable enforcement of tax laws but also that the citizens' right to be taxed should be 
protected both in the design of the tax policy and tax laws and in their implementation. 
In other words, taxation must be founded on a wide and transparent consultation. It must 
be built on a moral consensus around the need to nurture the tax system as a vital 
component of the national existence as well as the valued ownership of all citizens of the 
country. There must be room in a democratic society for a healthy debate on tax measures, 
although the tax system cannot be seen as a forum for protest against other perceived 
wrongs. 
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